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JOINT FORCES STAFF COLLEGE
JOINT ADVANCED WARFIGHTING SCHOOL



**CONVENTIONAL EXPEDITIONARY FORCES:
A 21st Century Triad for Strategic Deterrence**

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in partial satisfaction of the requirements of a Master of Science Degree in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.

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Abstract

Strategic deterrence has historically used the threat of a nuclear response to prevent wars. Considering the number of conflicts that have occurred under the nuclear umbrella, a policy of strategic deterrence that uses nuclear weapons as the primary way to deter conflict is ineffective in the 21st Century strategic environment. In this paper I make the argument that our policy of strategic deterrence should be centered on diplomacy backed by a policy of deploying conventional expeditionary forces as the primary way to deter conflict. Force projection, power projection, etc. are typical ways Combatant Commanders currently use such forces as a way to shape stakeholders in any particular theatre. Such employments are operational strategies intended to achieve theatre security objectives as part of an overarching strategy. A strategic deterrence strategy that uses expeditionary forces as the primary strategic deterrence is the bridge that is missing between the current nuclear deterrence posture and the military capabilities of smaller nations and regional partners.

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“The human desire for freedom is universal, but the growth of freedom is not inevitable. Without support from free nations, freedom’s spread could be hampered by the challenges we face ... We have a responsibility to promote human freedom. Yet freedom cannot be imposed; it must be chosen. The form that freedom and democracy take in any land will reflect the history, culture, and habits unique to its people.”

George W. Bush, 2006 National Security Strategy¹

I. Introduction

The 2006 National Security Strategy (NSS) and subsequent 2008 National Defense Strategy (NDS) lay the framework for all elements of national power to promote and protect U.S. national interests, which include protecting the nation and allies from “attack or coercion.” Central goals to both strategies are the promotion of freedom and to “build the capacity of fragile or vulnerable partners to withstand internal threats and external aggression.”²

The world recognizes American dominance, as illustrated by this quote from the British Broadcasting Corporation: “The USA is the world’s foremost economic and military power, with global interests and an unmatched global reach.”³ The U.S. military still remains the most powerful and capable force in the world which in itself has given cause to rising powers such as China and Russia to develop and or reassert their global military power. Yet as their comparative strength to the U.S. does not pose a significant threat to the military’s ability to win our nation’s wars, the U.S. would still prevail in a state-state war. But in an era of “persistent conflict” no future war is forecasted to be one

¹ The National Security Strategy of the United States, March 2006, 2, 5.

² The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, June 2008, 6. The phrase “promoting freedom” is used in the 2006 NSS as part of the first pillar upon which the NSS was formulated, while the 2008 NDS acknowledges those pillars, the NDS refers to *promoting security* in the body of text versus *promoting freedom*.

³ BBC. *Country Profile: United States of America*. January 21, 2009. Available online at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/country_profiles/1217752.stm#facts (accessed February 25, 2009)

state against another state, but rather any future conflict will be a multinational one. Perhaps the U.S.'s singular capability, nuclear weapons aside, is its ability to project and sustain power abroad backed by a national industrial complex unmatched by any nation. Yet as the two front war against an extremist Islamic ideology has shown, even the strongest power has limits. With forces engaged in a war on terror, the ability of the United States to respond credibly to aggression in other parts of the world have come into question, especially as Russian military vehicles raced into Georgia. The Russia-Georgia conflict showed that the U.S. could not credibly deter Russian aggression into Georgia while it was engaged in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.⁴ To deter conflict is a key objective of the National Defense Strategy. Deterrence is based on both credibility and "the ability to prevent an attack, respond decisively to any attack so as to discourage even contemplating an attack upon us, and strike accurately when necessary."⁵ However, as global commitments continue to stretch American conventional military forces, the capability to provide a credible conventional, non-nuclear deterrent to potential aggressors is diminished.

Both the NSS and NDS declare deterrence as a goal – it is the role of military strategies and strategic planners to achieve that goal. At the present moment, the United States has committed the bulk of its ground forces and nearly all of its strategic lift, and at least two carriers strike groups to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. These commitments are long-term; it will take years for the United States to refit and reposition forces for

⁴ In a series of press statements from April 2008 through September 2008, the Bush Administration condemned the rising and threatening troop deployments by Russia near Georgia and subsequent invasion into its sovereign territory. The U.S. actions to *deter* Russian military force failed. Only one of the Bush's initial statements is cited here. Sean McCormack. "Georgia: Escalation of Violence in South Ossetia and Abkhazia." *Military Education Research Library Network*. July 14, 2008. <http://merln.ndu.edu/archivepdf/russia/State/106999.pdf> (accessed March 4, 2009).

⁵ The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, June 2008, 6, 11.

future contingencies. Thus, the United States currently does not have the ability to maintain the current force presence in Iraq and Afghanistan and provide a credible deterrent threat to would be aggressor states against free and sovereign weaker nations that count on the U.S. for support and security. As a consequence, potential aggressors are emboldened to take actions knowing that the United States cannot provide a credible conventional deterrent. This, in turn, weakens American diplomatic efforts to prevent aggression.

As the range-of-military-operations are considered in today's strategic environment, it is apparent that an effective strategic conventional deterrence strategy is missing, though the U.S. can still address a multitude of threats. Strategic nuclear deterrence, so useful in the Cold War, is no longer as effective as it once was in the 21st Century. Nuclear disarmament discussions have gained more traction among world leaders in recent years than the past traditional lip service paid to disarmament. This discussion has been spurred by the changes of an already complex nuclear deterrence calculus becoming unmanageable with the proliferation of nuclear weapons states.⁶ "U.S. nuclear policy and strategy in [a] post-Cold War and post-9/11 security environment have not been well articulated and as a consequence are poorly understood both within and outside American borders," according to a joint working group report by AAAS, APS & POPA, and CSIS (Joint Working Group Report).⁷ At the same time the U.S. nuclear policy was blurring, Russia's reliance on nuclear weapons for its security was increasing. Central to the

⁶ Sharon Squassoni, *The New Disarmament Discussion*, January 2009, available online at: http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/squassoni_current_history.pdf, accessed 2 February 2009, 34.

⁷ Joint Working Group of AAAS, the American Physical Society, and the Center for Strategic and International Studies. *Nuclear Weapons in 21st Century U.S. National Security*. Working Group Study, U.S.: AAAS Publication Services, 2008, i.

concerns of nuclear policy in both the U.S. and Russia was the specific role of nonstrategic nuclear weapons or those nuclear weapons intended for tactical use during the Cold War, as Amy Woolf details in her July 2008 CRS Report for Congress.⁸ The essence of the blurring emanates from the perceived first-use of nonstrategic nuclear weapons by the U.S to deter potential regional conflicts and/or their first use to destroy deeply buried hardened targets, while Russia's security strategies incorporated their nonstrategic nuclear weapons to protect their national interests and for their defense in the face of NATO expansionism and U.S. ballistic missile plans.⁹

Russia, which still bases its military strategy on nuclear deterrence, is seeking to regain its position of influence in the near abroad by pressuring Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, Poland, Kazakhstan, Armenia, and Kyrgyzstan to conform to Russian security interests. A revitalized and radicalized Venezuela has the potential to destabilize portions of South America; China periodically takes a belligerent approach to Taiwan; and Iran seeks to gain dominance over the Middle East. There must exist a form of direct military support to in order to deter potential aggressors if the U.S. is to remain a strong influence in the world community and protect vital national interests as the only superpower. By assuming the role as the sole superpower in the world, the U.S. assumes a responsibility of providing military assistance to allies and friends if threatened by an aggressor.

Full-scale conventional responses, however, will not be an option for policymakers. National will in our country will not support an all-out war against another state with conventional forces unless there are clear vital interests at risk and

⁸ Amy F. Woolf. *Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons*. CRS Report for Congress, Washington D.C.: Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, 2008, 3-8.

⁹ Ibid, 20-21.

even then it would be divisive; wars of pre-emption and unilateral action will require clear, justifiable and articulated imminent threats. The strategic problem is further complicated by the fact that many friendly states seeking U.S. protection do not possess the military capabilities to defend themselves or more importantly, to deter a threat. A new policy declaration that employs conventional tailored expeditionary forces as a strategic deterrent that can deploy to enhance partner security postures and multiply their combat power is required in order to provide the credible deterrent needed to deter aggression and conflict.

This paper will examine deterrence policies from the end of World War II to today in order to analyze the trends of U.S. strategic deterrence. This paper examines recent strategic factors that have reshaped deterrence in the post-Cold War period and argues that a new strategic approach to deterrence, using rapidly deployable conventional forces, is necessary for the United States to achieve its own security goals as well as maintaining stability in the world.

“The gravest danger to the American people is the threat of a terrorist attack with a nuclear weapon and the spread of nuclear weapons to dangerous regimes.”

President Barack Obama, Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons¹⁰

II. The Current Strategic Landscape

The advent of the nuclear age ushered in an arms race between the United States and the former Soviet Union, polarizing the world in a Cold War that would last almost fifty years. The key difference between the environment of the Cold War period and today’s environment was that there was a clear threat to national survival and the U.S. relied on variations of a nuclear deterrence strategy to deter Soviet expansion.¹¹ With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1992, so did the threat that more or less drove the Cold War and the role of nuclear deterrence.

Today’s current strategic landscape is defined by many globalizing trends that will continue to influence national and international relationships and actions over the next 20 to 30 years. These trends include the interdependency of world economies, global energy demands, rogue states, and the security threat posed by the rise of non-state actors. The 2008 Joint Operating Environment (JOE), November 2008, details other trends: demographics, globalization, economics, energy, food, water, climate change and natural disasters, pandemics, cyber, and space.¹² The near and long term of these trends underpins international relations, and politics perhaps like no other time in history, and the values and beliefs of each nation will determine how these trends will be addressed.

¹⁰ The White House - President Barack Obama. *Foreign Policy*. 2009. Available online at http://www.whitehouse.gov/agenda/foreign_policy/ (accessed March 4, 2009).

¹¹ The U.S. containment strategy that originated with the Truman administration and was adapted and modified by subsequent administrations is discussed in more detail in Chapter II.

¹² United States Joint Forces Command, *The Joint Operating Environment 2008: Challenges and Implications for the Future Joint Force*, November 200 8, pp 10-23.

Europe, Russia, and Japan are experiencing significant declines in their population growth rates and must contend with the social issue of caring for an aging population, while the inverse is true in many developing countries where 95% of the world's growth rate is projected to occur.¹³ In many developing countries where the youth growth rate is expected to rapidly grow, such as the Adecan region of Latin America across to Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and the Caucasus, to northern parts of South Asia, governments must contend with a phenomenon known as the “youth bulge” – a youthful age structure, with a rapidly growing young working age population that faces relatively little economic opportunities and thus may be more susceptible to violent extremist organizations (VEOs).¹⁴

The National Intelligence Council's recent publication *Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World*, describes a shift in relative wealth and economic power from the West to the East that has seen the rise of emerging powers such as China, India and a resurgent Russia creating a multi-polar world, though the United States is expected to remain the single most powerful country in 2025.¹⁵ These global trends have changed the strategic landscape in such a way that deterrence is made more difficult, and identifying the threat is more challenging.

The number of countries in the developing world that will possess the population and economic strength to build military capabilities that can project power in their region is projected to grow from six countries to eleven by the 2030s, with Bangladesh, Nigeria,

¹³ The U.S. Census Bureau estimated growth rates add approximately 60 million people each year for a total of 8 billion by the 2030s, with approximately 95% of that growth occurring in developing countries such as India. United States Joint Forces Command, *The Joint Operating Environment 2008: Challenges and Implications for the Future Joint Force*, November 2008, p 10.

¹⁴ U.S. National Intelligence Council, “Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World”, November 2008, iv.

¹⁵ Ibid, 1.

Pakistan, the Philippines, and Vietnam joining China, Russia, India, Indonesia, Brazil, and Mexico.¹⁶

The results of this changing strategic landscape is that developing nations that may not possess a significant military capability today may feel obligated to develop them as their youthful populations grow, the need for jobs increases, and the demand to secure natural resources rises in order to fuel their growing economies continues.

Countries that currently rely on U.S. security guarantees are vulnerable as long as the United States is strategically overstretched.

Threat Environment

Non-state actors, or terrorists, have emerged as global networks that are able to conduct global networked terror attacks. The global security threat will emanate from non-state actors that seek to expand their global influence through VEO networks that seek to take advantage of dual-use technologies and acquire nuclear weapons. A comprehensive and collaborative report by the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), the American Physical Society and Panel on Public Affairs (APS & POPA), and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), titled *Nuclear Weapons in 21st Century U.S. National Security*, prioritizes threats to the U.S. from nuclear weapons in the following order: nuclear terrorism, nuclear proliferation, nuclear threats against regional allies and friends, nuclear threats against the U.S. from regional nuclear-armed states, and the emergence of a Cold War-like threat

¹⁶ United States Joint Forces Command, *The Joint Operating Environment 2008: Challenges and Implications for the Future Joint Force*, November 200 8, p 14.

from a nuclear armed major power.¹⁷ Nuclear terrorism and the nuclear proliferation, rank one and two respectively, due to dual-use technologies that offer a wide-range of responsible uses that may be applied by VEOs “to unconventional weapons [and] continue to spread globally at a rapid rate, and the growing demand (and competition) for energy... has the potential to fuel nuclear proliferation pressures in strategically important and sometimes unstable parts of the world.”¹⁸ As VEOs are not susceptible to traditional forms of deterrence (discussed in Chapter IV), the acquisition of nuclear weapons and/or other weapons of mass destruction by these VEOs represents the most significant global threat. Said another way, “the proliferation of nuclear weapons poses the greatest threat to our [U.S.] national security,”¹⁹ because of the ineffectiveness of deterrence against VEOs.

Overlaid on this threat is the security of nuclear weapons and materials. If the difficulties and challenges are represented by building a consensus in a war against extremists, how much more so is the challenge of building an international consensus to ensure non-state actors do not acquire WMDs and developing nations, such as Iran, that embrace the belief that the “annihilation” of a people do not become a nuclear weapons capable state? Underlying this global challenge is the fact the several states already possess nuclear weapons and many more are potential proliferators. The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) Nuclear Forces Guide lists the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, China, India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea as nuclear

¹⁷ Joint Working Group of AAAS, the American Physical Society, and the Center for Strategic and International Studies. *Nuclear Weapons in 21st Century U.S. National Security*. Working Group Study, U.S.: AAAS Publication Services, 2008, 2-3.

¹⁸ Paul I. Bernstein, *International Partnerships to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction*, National Defense University Press, Washington, D.C., May 2008 available online at http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Occasional_Papers/OP6.pdf, 1.

¹⁹ The National Security Strategy of the United States, March 2006, 2, 19.

weapons states, and Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Belarus, Brazil, Chechnya, Cuba, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Kazakhstan, Libya, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, South Africa, South Korea, Sudan, Syria, Taiwan, and Ukraine as potential proliferators.²⁰ This list of countries represent thousands of years of history and cultures that somehow must be bridged in order to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear technology and materials. Of the nuclear weapons states, North Korea's "nuclear weapons and missile programs threaten to destabilize a region that has known many great power conflicts and compromises some of the world's largest economies,"²¹ while concerns about Iran's intentions to develop a nuclear weapon remains. It is believed Iran will have the technical capability to produce enough highly enriched uranium for a weapon around 2010-2015.²² While the nuclear competition is not assessed to have negatively impacted relations between India and Pakistan over the past several years, Pakistan's political instability gives rise to the concerns of the physical security of its nuclear weapons inventory and corresponding technology.²³

Many of the potential proliferators are motivated perhaps more by the need to meet their energy demands than for weaponization in order to gain energy independence. Ukraine for example, is investigating nuclear enrichment. Additionally, other nations associate "*nuclear* not just with security or energy, but with modernity as well ... access to nuclear science and technology is seen by those who consider themselves behind as a

²⁰ "Nuclear Forces Guide", Available online at <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide>, accessed 16 Jan 2009

²¹ McConnell, J. Michael. *Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence*. Unclassified Statement for the Record, Washington D.C.: Director of National Intelligence, 2008, 14.

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid, 15.

powerful means to join the community of advanced nations.”²⁴ Such endeavors to acquire nuclear technology are arguably within the sovereign rights of a nation to pursue. So, as *advanced nations* seek to *deter* the proliferation of nuclear technology and the potential for the tangential spread of a nuclear weapons program, the sovereign rights of a nation to provide for its security and domestic needs must also be addressed in addition to the global demand for energy. Nonetheless the impact of the proliferation of nuclear weapons capable states demands a credible strategic deterrence strategy in order to deter conflict.

Fledgling Democracies and Rising Powers

Since the collapse of the former Soviet Union, several new democracies have joined the international community. Poland, Ukraine, and Georgia, for example, have claimed their independence and have been relatively successful, despite their vulnerability relative to the economic and military power of Russia.²⁵ Nuclear technology offers a way to sever the energy dependence from Russia by these former Eastern bloc countries. Additionally, many fledgling democracies would demonstrate their internal political and security vulnerabilities to extremists and hostile states that would result in regional conflicts, demanding external intervention by world powers such as the Bosnia-Serbia conflict of the 1990s. China’s recent ascent as an economic superpower driven by a massive middle class growth has made obtaining access to

²⁴ Paul I. Bernstein, John P. Caves, Jr., and John F. Reichart, *The Future Nuclear Landscape*, Center of the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, National Defense University Press, April 2007, p. 2

²⁵ Russia use of military force to counter Georgia’s action in South Ossetia, criticized as “disproportionate”, show the extent to which Russia is willing to impose its will on former Soviet Bloc countries that it continues to isolate and influence through economic means and cyber attacks. Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Staring Down the Russians*, *Time*, August 14, 2008, available online at <http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,1832699,00.html>, accessed 3 September 2008.

energy resources a main focus of effort in its foreign policy.²⁶ China has obtained oil agreements with countries such as Iran that concern many U.S. policymakers who believe China's energy needs will lead it to oppose U.S. foreign policy objectives that could result in increased tensions between the two.²⁷

Both Russia and China continue to modernize their military capabilities and although their conventional capabilities do not pose a direct threat to the U.S., their strategic choices that impact regional and international security require the U.S. to hedge against their efforts.²⁸ Russia's recent port calls to Venezuela and Cuba and its renewed efforts to upgrade its long-range bombers demonstrate a desire to renew its global power projection.²⁹ The *2008 Annual Report to Congress on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China* welcomes the rise of a *stable, peaceful, and prosperous* China, recognizing China's growth as a regional and economic power and growing global influence, while highlighting a range of military modernization activities that lack transparency, which requires the need to *hedge* against the unknown.³⁰ This requirement to hedge translates into a requirement for a broad deterrence strategy for the U.S. as represented by the sheer spending on U.S. defense as depicted in figure 1.

²⁶ Wayne M. Morrison, CRS Report for Congress on China's Economic Conditions, Washington D.C., September 2008, 24.

²⁷ Wayne M. Morrison, CRS Report for Congress on China's Economic Conditions, Washington D.C., September 2008, 25.

²⁸ The National Defense Strategy of the United States, June 2008, 3.

²⁹ A Russian naval squadron consisting of a nuclear-powered cruiser and a destroyer made a port call in Venezuela on 25 November 2008, BBC News, *Venezuela welcomes Russian ships*, 25 November 2008, available on-line at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/2/hi/americas/7747793.stm>, accessed on 21 February 2009. The port call in Cuba on 12 December of 2008 was part of the same deployment to Latin America that brought it to Venezuela was not seen as a military threat to the U.S.. Moscow News, *Russian warships visit Cuba*, 12 December 2008, available on-line at <http://mnweekly.rian.ru/new/20081218/55361828.html>, accessed 19 February 2009.

³⁰ Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress, Military Power of the People's Republic of China, 2008.



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Budget Authority for National Defense, FY 1948-2009 (in billions of constant FY09 dollars)



Figure 1. Budget Authority for National Defense, FY 1948 – 2009; includes funding for wars and nuclear weapons.³¹

The globalization trends of world economies combined with the global demand for energy and resources and regional youth bulges call into question whether the world will see another conventional state-versus-state war, let alone a nuclear confrontation, as these global issues require a global solution. Additionally, the common global threat of non-state actors or VEOs acting within the borders of states and conducting transnational attacks requires an international cooperative strategy as well. This threat is compounded by the proliferation of nuclear weapons states, the stated intent of VEOs to acquire WMDs, and the ineffectiveness of deterrence against such non-state actors. Is it truly

³¹ Sharp, Travis. "Fiscal Year 2010 Pentagon Defense Spending Request: February "Topline"." *Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation*. February 26, 2009. Available online at: http://armscontrolcenter.org/assets/pdfs/feb2009_dod_topline_analysis.pdf (accessed February 28, 2009), 7.

realistic to apply deterrence measures against a non-state actor whose leadership, location and logic calculus are relatively unpredictable or fluid at best?

Given a successful attack by a non-state actor using a nuclear weapon or other WMD, the threat of a retaliatory strike is ineffective as a deterrent as the attack will have most likely originated within the another sovereign state, whose vast majority of citizens will have not have been a part of the attack. These arguments support various international movements to abolish nuclear weapons if they cease to serve a realistic purpose in national security postures in the current strategic environment and support the position that international nuclear expertise should focus on nonproliferation and counter-proliferation efforts.³² While few if any states possess the conventional military capabilities that can meet their own national security needs as that of the United States and could thereby reasonably disarm their nuclear arsenals, countries such as France still view nuclear deterrence as a vital protection against a wide range of threats.³³ Yet, as efforts such as nonproliferation and counter-proliferation are primarily a diplomatic and law enforcement effort, the role of nuclear deterrence is further brought into question as a viable long-term strategic deterrence.

³² George Perkovich, *Abolishing Nuclear Weapons: Why the United States Should Lead*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC. 2008. In this brief, George Perkovich summarizes four security interests that would be served by abolishing nuclear weapons – preventing proliferation, preventing nuclear terrorism, reducing to zero the threat of nuclear annihilation, and fostering optimism regarding U.S. global leadership. Though he makes the case for the U.S. to lead the effort, he acknowledges that countries such as Russia, China, France, Pakistan and Israel have less confidence than the U.S. that their security interests could be achieved without nuclear weapons.

³³ Sharon Squassoni, *The New Disarmament Discussion*, January 2009, available online at: http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/squassoni_current_history.pdf, accessed 2 February 2009, 35.

Additionally, given these global trends existing alliances need to be reevaluated. Alliances such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization³⁴ (NATO) were effective at confronting a Cold War standoff with the Warsaw Pact, but Cold War rules are not responsive to the rapidly changing 21st century dynamic strategic environment and myriad of threats posed to states. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), established in 2001 and composed of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan with Mongolia, India, Iran and Pakistan joining later as observers, has steadily grown into a “full-blown” security organization.³⁵ In October 2007, SCO signed a memorandum of understanding with the Russian-led military alliance, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and pledged to work closely with one another, leveraging the CSTO rapid-reaction forces.³⁶ Apparently, the CSTO is committed to combating “terrorism, separatism, and extremism” which it called a threat to international peace and security and a threat to the territorial integrity and security of the member states. It is not clear whether or not the SCO was formed to counter the influences of NATO or the encirclement of expanding democracies supported by implied or explicit U.S. security guarantees or if it was truly formed as a regional counterterrorism entity intended to truly to support international peace and stability.

The central point is that current political and economic institutionalized structures designed for a Cold War environment are not sufficient in and of themselves to deter

³⁴ NATO was formed in April 1949, Headquartered in Brussels, Belgium, as a system of collective defense in response to an attack by any external party – an attack on one, was an attack on all. Doubts about the effectiveness of the alliance since the Korean war led states such as France to seek and acquire its own nuclear deterrent. <http://www.nato.int>.

³⁵ Peter J. Pham. "NATO's New Rival." *The National Interest*. August 19, 2008. Available online at: <http://www.nationalinterest.org> (accessed September 3, 2008).

³⁶ Ibid.

aggression in today's environment.³⁷ Archaic institutions bolstered by political and bureaucratic indecision lack the credibility to respond to emerging threats in order to provide the credibility needed to deter aggression at the start. New agreements bolstered by security alliances are needed to address the security challenges of the 21st century.

The compounding effects of globalizing trends, growing threats, and increasing irrelevant alliances combine to shape the requirement for a state-versus-state deterrence strategy. States will need to secure access to resources, form coalitions, and protect populations despite the growing non-state actor threat. These state responsibilities require conventional forces. Many states are unable to field and maintain a large conventional force thereby leaving the U.S. with a leading role in deterring other major powers or rogue states (China, Russia, Iran, North Korea) from threatening neighbors or key U.S. strategic partners (Saudi Arabia, Israel, Taiwan, Poland, Baltic States, Ukraine). In short, the 21st century environment requires a 21st century strategic deterrence strategy.

³⁷ Dr. James Jay Carafano and Mr. Henry Brands recently called for the creation of a new approach to security alliances by the U.S and other free nations in their article, *Building a Global Freedom Coalition with a New "Security for Freedom Fund."* Although not intended to be a military alliance with a mutual defense clause like NATO, Carafano and Brands' proposed Security for Freedom Fund recognizes that the 21st strategic environment requires more responsive, adaptive policies and organizations to address the rapidly changing threats. The Global Freedom Coalition (GFC) outlined by Carafano and Brands would require that members meet and demonstrate four principle criteria in order to receive Security for Freedom Funds: a demonstrated commitment to freedom and human rights; a commitment to the rule of law and governance; mutual bilateral security interests with the U.S. and its allies; and demonstrated need for U.S. military assistance. Carafano and Brands argue that such an approach, modeled after the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) program, would allow smaller nations that are committed to the principles above yet lack the self-capacity to provide for their own defense, to receive security aid and participate with developed nations on working to confront global security issues without the "baggage associated with other economic and political institutions ... [and] give these countries a powerful new incentive to continue along the path to political and economic freedom." Carafano, Dr. James Jay, and Henry Brands. "Building a Global Freedom Coalition with a New "Security for Freedom Fund"." *The Heritage Foundation Leadership for America*. February 4, 2009. Available online at: http://www.heritage.org/Research/InternationalOrganizations/upload/bg_2236.pdf (accessed February 28, 2009), 2-6.

“It is an extraordinarily difficult thing... to find out just what might be done that would be productive of a result justifying the doing.”

George C. Marshall, Secretary of State 1947-1949³⁸

II. U.S. Policy Trends Related to Deterrence

In order to assess the role and purpose of strategic deterrence today, an examination of past policies and trends is useful. The roots of the U.S. containment strategy were formulated during the Truman administration in 1948. The Eisenhower administration adopted massive retaliation and increased U.S. commitments to alliances overseas. The Kennedy administration moved to a more flexible approach and developed more military capabilities to address global threats beyond containment. The Carter doctrine created the Rapid Deployment Force as a response to threats in the Middle East. The Reagan administration built upon the flexible response approach by increasing defense spending to build large military forces and capabilities that applied a cost imposing strategy against the Soviet Union. These historical policies established a strategic deterrent framework that extended U.S. security guarantees from North America to Europe to Japan, under a nuclear deterrent umbrella intended to dissuade those that it covered from developing nuclear weapons of their own while deterring Soviet expansion and regional conflicts.

Truman Doctrine

³⁸ George C. Marshall, *Marshall Testimony of November 10-11, 1947*, Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 8th Congress 1st Session on Interim Aid for Europe, November 1947, available online at <http://www.marshallfoundation.org/Database.htm>, accessed February 17, 2009, 17.

In a special message to Congress on March 12, 1947, regarding providing aid and assistance to Greece and Turkey, Truman announced a new foreign policy for the United States that as served as the basis for strategic deterrence in the twentieth century.

We shall not realize our objectives, however, unless we are willing to help free peoples to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes... If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world-and we shall surely endanger the welfare of this Nation.³⁹

The Truman Doctrine became the basis of the U.S. containment strategy that sought to limit Soviet expansion. A preemptive war against the Soviets was contrary to “American tradition and universal standards of morality” and the “exploitation of this atomic monopoly was never seriously considered.”⁴⁰ The U.S. assumed global security responsibilities as a nuclear power. Truman sought to prevent nuclear weapons technology from spreading and extended the U.S. nuclear umbrella to Japan and Europe to contain Soviet expansion. The Truman administration published National Security Council 68 (NSC-68) which laid out U.S. strategic goals and objectives for containment. NSC-68 also made recommendations for policies to support these strategic goals. One in particular stressed the need for the U.S. and its Allies to build-up conventional forces to confront communism wherever it threatened expansion for any “gain by communism” was seen as a “loss to the West.”⁴¹ NSC-68 effectively made the world black and white, liberal democracy against communism, and resulted in increased security commitments

³⁹ The Truman Doctrine available online at www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/doctrine/large/index.php, Accessed 25 Jan 2009, p. 3

⁴⁰ Steven W. Hook and John Spanier, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II, 15th ed.*, Washington, DC, CQ Press, 2000, 45.

⁴¹ Alan P. Dobson and Steve Marsh, *U.S. Foreign Policy Since 1945, 2nd ed.*, New York, Routledge, 2006, 33.

outside of the U.S. from which the U.S. has since never retracted. The NSC-68 also drew a line in the world that would align smaller nations with either the U.S. and its allies or with the Soviets and the Warsaw Pact.

Eisenhower wanted to avoid an arms race with the Soviets and achieve “containment on the cheap” by increasing alliances and regional cooperation to share the global burden while assuring allies and discomforting the Soviets by encircling them.⁴² The strategic approach of NSC-68 was largely embraced by the new president Dwight D. Eisenhower. He viewed any gain by communism as not just loss for the West, but a “triple defeat...a potential ally was lost, an implacable enemy gained a new recruit, and U.S. credibility was damaged.”⁴³ To avoid this triple loss, Eisenhower, with Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, responded with massive retaliation. Massive retaliation relied on the American “superiority in air power and nuclear weapons.” Eisenhower and Dulles believed that nuclear forces would be cheaper than building and maintaining large conventional forces and would reduce the reliance on overseas basing requirements.⁴⁴ While deterring the Soviets, massive retaliation was also intended to *assure* allies. By tailoring this approach, Eisenhower set the course for all future U.S. deterrence strategies.

Neither Truman nor Eisenhower was successful in reducing the U.S. international security commitments with their deterrence strategies. The nuclear umbrella broadened American overseas commitments and massive retaliation was of no use as a deterrent

⁴² Alan P. Dobson and Steve Marsh, *U.S. Foreign Policy Since 1945*, 2nd ed., New York, Routledge, 2006, 34-35.

⁴³ Ibid, 34.

⁴⁴ Ibid, 34.

when the 1956 Hungarian revolt was ruthlessly crushed by the Soviets.⁴⁵ The relative cost of the military expenditures for containment under Truman became the cost of U.S. commitments to alliances under Eisenhower.

Kennedy – Balanced Deterrence of Flexible Response

The Kennedy administration moved the U.S. away from a strategic deterrence policy that relied solely on a massive nuclear response. Kennedy, like his predecessors, embraced containment, but was focused primarily on deterring a deliberate attack by “making it clear to potential enemies that in all circumstances an attack would result in unacceptable losses to the attacker. This deterrence depends critically on our ability to strike back after a direct Soviet attack”⁴⁶ – thus deterrence was again modified to ensure that the Soviet Union would suffer a counterstrike if it launched a nuclear attack first. Kennedy also extended the nuclear security umbrella to emphasize that “the reality of our power to strike back must be clear to the Communists, to our Allies, and to ourselves.”⁴⁷ Yet, it was clear that nuclear deterrence alone was not sufficient. The Kennedy administration recognized that its lack of flexibility to respond represented a fundamental weakness in the nation’s strategic policy.⁴⁸

Kennedy moved to a strategic posture of flexible response to “provide a responsible, controlled power of selected response that can appropriately meet a wide

⁴⁵President Eisenhower's policy was to promote the independence of the so-called captive nations, but only over the longer-term. Though upset about the crushing response to the revolt, there was little the United States could do short of risking global war to help the rebels and he was not prepared to go that far. Malcolm Byrne. "The 1956 Hungarian Revolt." *The National Security Archive*. November 4, 2002. Available online at <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB76/index.html> (accessed March 13, 2009).

⁴⁶ Foreign Relations, 1961 – 1963, Volume VIII, p. 37.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Ibid, 41.

range of possible threats.”⁴⁹ By adopting a posture of *flexible response*, Kennedy sought a means to respond to emerging conflicts with conventional forces rather than *deter* them at the strategic level. However, as both the U.S. and Soviet Union were considered peers, the use of conventional forces as credible strategic deterrent was not realistic, as they were unproven and did not present the calculated deterrent risk associated with the destructive power of nuclear weapons. “Flexible response...never represented a strategy in the same sense as deterrence by Mutually Assured Destruction [MAD] ... but widened the range of decisions by recommending that some of all kinds of forces be procured and held in positions of highest flexibility ... deliberately maximizing the options available ... [to] be ready for anything.”⁵⁰ Flexible response represented ad hoc measures taken by the United States to enhance deterrence during the 1960s where limited wars or brushfire wars threatened. Though flexible response reinforced deterrence with conventional responses such as the 1961 Berlin blockade, 1962 Cuban missile crisis and the U.S. commitment of ground forces to the Vietnam War in 1965, it was ineffectual as a deterrence policy because there was never a clear stated policy of what the U.S would do to protect vital interests and allies from aggressors to consider before deciding on the use-of-force as existed for MAD.

Kennedy also introduced a command and control structure to monitor and respond to emerging global threats. In 1962, under the direction of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Strike Command (STRICOM) was established by integrating general purpose forces available in the continental U.S. (CONUS) for rapid overseas deployment from the

⁴⁹ Foreign Relations, 1961 – 1963, Volume VIII, 43.

⁵⁰ Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke. *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice*. New York & London: Columbia University Press, 1974, 42-43.

Strategic Army Corps (STRAC), which contained combat ready units from the Continental Army Command (CONARC); the composite air strike forces of Tactical Air Command (TAC); and Navy and Marine Corps forces officially integrated four years later.^{51 52} Initially, STRICOM's assigned missions were "to provide a general reserve for reinforcement of other unified commands, train assigned forces, develop joint doctrine, and plan for and execute contingency operations if ordered by the JCS."⁵³ Shortly thereafter, STRICOM's missions were expanded to include planning for, and execution of, operations in the Middle East, sub-Sahara Africa, and Southern Asia (MEAFSA) which included the Red Sea and Persian Gulf.⁵⁴ STRICOM did not serve as a deterrent force, but rather it served as contingency command.⁵⁵ STRICOM offered a way to exercise command and control, plan for, and respond to emerging contingencies rather than provide an overarching deterrence strategy.

Kennedy's flexible response was based on deterring a direct attack against the United States by the Soviet Union. Flexible response provided options to respond to conventional conflicts - not deter them - by incorporating the idea that the timely arrival

⁵¹Ronald H. Cole, Watler S. Poole, James F. Schnabel, Robert J. Watson, and Willard J. Webb. "History of the Unified Command Plan 1946-1993." *DTIC Online*. February 1995. <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/history/ucp.pdf> (accessed February 24, 2009), 32-33.

⁵² Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr., and Thomas-Durell Young. "Defining U.S. Atlantic Command's Role in the Power Projection Strategy." *Strategic Studies Institute*. August 1998. <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub307.pdf> (accessed February 24, 2009), 3.

⁵³ Ronald H. Cole, Watler S. Poole, James F. Schnabel, Robert J. Watson, and Willard J. Webb. "History of the Unified Command Plan 1946-1993." *DTIC Online*. February 1995. <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/history/ucp.pdf> (accessed February 24, 2009), 33.

⁵⁴ *Ibid*, 34.

⁵⁵STRICOM would be redesignated U.S. Readiness Command (REDCOM) in 1970 upon subsequent strategic guidance and fiscal restraints with no change in missions except for the addition of the responsibility to plan for and provide joint task force headquarters for operations not assigned to other commands and the divestiture of responsibility for operations in the MEAFSA. In 1983, REDCOM's missions would be divided into modern day Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) and US Central Command. Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr., and Thomas-Durell Young. "Defining U.S. Atlantic Command's Role in the Power Projection Strategy." *Strategic Studies Institute*. August 1998. <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub307.pdf> (accessed February 24, 2009), 3-4.

of U.S. expeditionary and Allied forces to a crisis area could avoid the need for a larger commitment of forces later.⁵⁶ Flexible response remained a part of U.S. deterrence strategy and was used by President Richard Nixon in the 1973 Yom Kippur War. The aftermath of that war led the U.S. to play a greater role in the Middle East and Persian Gulf.

As tensions in the Persian Gulf region continued to increase, President Jimmy Carter directed on 24 August 1977 that “a study be made of creating a rapid deployment force (RDF) of two or more light divisions for use in the Persian Gulf region.”⁵⁷ The December 1979 invasion into Afghanistan by the Soviet Union increased the urgency for the development of the RDF. The Joint Chiefs of Staff established a CONUS-based Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force Headquarters (RDJTF) in 1980, which was prepared to plan, train, deploy forces, and to conduct operations anywhere in the world. Like Kennedy’s STRICOM, its focus was the Middle East and Africa.”⁵⁸ The President’s January 1980 State of the Union address formulated the Carter Doctrine:

An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force ... We are also improving our capability to deploy U.S. military forces rapidly to distant areas ... We've helped to strengthen NATO and our other alliances, and recently we and other NATO members have decided to develop and to deploy modernized, intermediate-range nuclear forces to meet an unwarranted and increased threat from the nuclear weapons of the Soviet Union ... We've increased and strengthened our naval presence in the Indian Ocean, and we are now making arrangements for key naval and air facilities to be used by our forces in the region of northeast Africa and the Persian Gulf ...⁵⁹

⁵⁶ Foreign Relations, 1961 – 1963, Volume VIII, p. 43.

⁵⁷ Ronald H. Cole, Watler S. Poole, James F. Schnabel, Robert J. Watson, and Willard J. Webb. "History of the Unified Command Plan 1946-1993." *DTIC Online*. February 1995. <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/history/ucp.pdf> (accessed February 24, 2009), 66.

⁵⁸ *Ibid*, 67-68.

⁵⁹ Jimmy Carter. "State of the Union Address 1980." *Jimmy Carter Library & Museum*. January 23, 1980. <http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/documents/speeches/su80jec.phtml> (accessed February 24, 2009).

In this speech, Carter's strategic deterrence message to the Soviet Union emphasized any means necessary, but left open whether that military force will be conventional or nuclear. Despite not specifically stating what type of military force would be employed, the limitation of nuclear weapons to deter conventional military action is obvious, as it was for Eisenhower and Kennedy.⁶⁰ Carter did approach the use of conventional capabilities as a realistic and credible deterrent, but never implemented a formal strategy.

In 1981, President Ronald Reagan in a policy statement continued to emphasize flexible response that addressed maintaining both a conventional and nuclear military capability to deter the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact in order to protect U.S. allies in Europe. "American policy toward deterring conflict in Europe has not changed for over 20 years. Our strategy remains, as it has been, one of flexible response: maintaining an assured military capability to deter the use of force – conventional or nuclear – by the Warsaw pact at the lowest possible level."⁶¹

As with many other past Presidents, Reagan's policy was intended to *assure* allies and *deter* Soviet aggression. However, like Carter, Reagan saw limited use for nuclear weapons. While maintaining a powerful arsenal Reagan admitted their limitations, recognizing that "the awful and incalculable risks associated with any use of nuclear weapons themselves serve to deter their use."⁶² Reagan articulated the limits of nuclear weapons as a strategic deterrent, but clearly asserted their utility. He described the

⁶⁰ Jimmy Carter. "State of the Union Address 1980." *Jimmy Carter Library & Museum*. January 23, 1980. <http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/documents/speeches/su80jec.phtml> (accessed February 24, 2009).

⁶¹ Ronald Reagan. Statement on United States Strategic Policy, Oct 21, 1981, <http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1981/102181b.htm>

⁶² Ibid.

“essence of U.S. nuclear strategy is that no aggressor should believe that the use of nuclear weapons in Europe could reasonably be limited to Europe.”⁶³ It was this deterrence strategy, maintained by every American President since 1947, that won the Cold War.

Current Deterrence Strategies

The internal collapse of the Soviet Union left the United States as the lone superpower. The 2001 *Nuclear Posture Review* (NPR) announced a shift to a new triad of active and passive defenses, nuclear and conventional offensive strike systems, and a revitalized defense infrastructure intended to provide new capabilities to meet new emerging threats, while reducing the reliance on nuclear weapons.⁶⁴ The 2001 NPR described four defense policy goals of *assure*, *dissuade*, *deter* and *defeat* and uses non-nuclear forces to provide additional offensive strike capability.⁶⁵ Two of these are traditional goals – assure and deter – while dissuade and defeat were added as a reflection of the new strategic uncertainty.

Although the NPR was intended to address the security environment of a post-Cold War environment, it was criticized for blurring the distinction between conventional

⁶³ Ronald Reagan. Statement on United States Strategic Policy, Oct 21, 1981, <http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1981/102181b.htm>.

⁶⁴ The New Triad was intended to reduce the U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons while improving the ability “to deter attack in the face of proliferating WMD capabilities” with the addition of defenses and non-nuclear strike forces conceived to reduce reliance on nuclear forces to provide its offensive strike capability. Excerpts of Classified Nuclear Posture Review, Submitted to Congress on 31 December 2001, January 2002, available online at <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm>, accessed October 16, 2008.

⁶⁵ Excerpts of Classified Nuclear Posture Review, Submitted to Congress on 31 December 2001, January 2002, available online at <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm>, accessed October 16, 2008.

and nuclear forces, while placing greater emphasis on nuclear weapons.⁶⁶ The NPR was criticized because it “rejected[s] deterrence in favor of nuclear warfighting.”⁶⁷ The central problem is that nuclear deterrence has a limited use in a post Cold-War strategic environment. Proponents of the NPR argued that it did not reject deterrence, but rather emphasized the importance of improving it to counter post-Cold War security threats.⁶⁸ The demands of the New Triad reflected several initiatives such as converting four ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) taken out of service into guided missile submarines (SSGN) and the development of *Precision Strike, Long Range Strike*, and capabilities to locate, identify, characterize, and target adversarial hard and deeply buried targets (*Defeating, Hard and Deeply-Buried Targets*)”⁶⁹ Intended to address the threats of the 21st century, the NPR may have unintentionally contributed to the proliferation of not only nuclear technology, but also spurred a conventional arms race as China and Russia have undertaken policies to modernize their militaries. During the period 2001 – 2006, the multiple national security documents published by the United States addressed a strategy to counter the proliferation of WMD more than articulate a strategy to deter state-state conflict.⁷⁰ Nuclear and conventional deterrence strategies were blurred in terms of assure, dissuade, deter, and defeat.

⁶⁶ Keith B. Payne, The Nuclear Posture Review: Setting the Record Straight, The Washington Quarterly, Summer 2005, 136.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Keith B. Payne, The Nuclear Posture Review: Setting the Record Straight, The Washington Quarterly, Summer 2005, 136.

⁶⁹ Excerpts of Classified Nuclear Posture Review, Submitted to Congress on 31 December 2001, January 2002, available online at <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm>, accessed October 16, 2008.

⁷⁰ See Appendix B for a brief discussion of national security documents related to non-proliferation.

The 2006 NSS states that the U.S. deterrent strategy “no longer rests primarily on the grim premise of inflicting devastating consequences on potential foes.”⁷¹

Safe, credible, and reliable nuclear forces continue to play a critical role. We are strengthening deterrence by developing a New Triad composed of offensive strike systems (both nuclear and improved conventional capabilities); active and passive defenses, including missile defenses; and a responsive infrastructure, all bound together by enhanced command and control, planning, and intelligence systems. These capabilities will better deter some of the new threats we face, while also bolstering our security commitments to allies.⁷²

In this statement the recognition that the threats that face the U.S. are complex is seen along with a wide range of capabilities and a strategy to address them. The Bush Administration introduced *Tailored Deterrence* in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) recognizing that a threat of nuclear destruction was no longer effective or appropriate in the security environment of the 21st century⁷³ as a way to deter the new threats. Several questions have been raised regarding *tailored deterrence*, specifically “How does *it* [tailored deterrence] differ from previous strategies? Whom is the U.S. trying to deter, from doing what, and in what circumstances? What does one need to know in order to deter in each case?”⁷⁴ The important strategic question is how is it possible to develop the wide range of capabilities needed and to craft the *tailored* messages to deter the multi-actors at play in a multi-polar world? The NDS recognizes these challenges reiterating the need to “*tailor deterrence* to fit particular actors, situations, and forms of warfare.”⁷⁵

⁷¹ The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, March 2006, 22.

⁷² The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, March 2006, 22.

⁷³ The Department of Defense Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 2006, 49.

⁷⁴ M. Elaine Bunn, “Can Deterrence Be Tailored?” available online at <http://www.ndu.edu/inss> accessed November 2, 2008, 1.

⁷⁵ The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, June 2008, 12.

However, the most recent strategy document continues the *assure*, *dissuade*, *deter*, and *defeat* theme of the 2001 NPR and applies it in the original context of broad deterrence. The 2008 National Defense Strategy (NDS) lists five objectives for the Department of Defense to support the NSS and provide security to the U.S. as: defend the homeland, win the long war, promote security, deter conflict, and win our nation's wars.⁷⁶ To *deter conflict*, the NDS outlines a strategy that includes: the NPR's tailored deterrence to deter and dissuade a multitude of actors, the requirement for both offensive – nuclear and conventional – and defensive military capabilities, the requirement to build the ability to withstand attack and recover quickly from an attack, and the requirement for an interagency and international approach to make use of all available resources to provide a credible deterrence in today's complex threat environment.

The NDS view of deterrence is rooted in historical U.S policy trends since 1947. The NDS emphasizes that “deterrence is key to preventing conflicts and enhancing security ... based on credibility: the ability to prevent attack, respond decisively to any attack so as to discourage even contemplating an attack upon us, and strike accurately when necessary.”⁷⁷ This is a consistent message when compared to Eisenhower's massive retaliation that was intended to *discourage* or dissuade an attack on the U.S. and its allies, and Kennedy's mutually assured destruction designed to assure allies and the Soviet Union that the U.S. would be able to strike back decisively after an initial attack. Each approach resulted in increased military expenditures to source the respective deterrence strategies, however, the role of the U.S. nuclear strategic forces was more clear during the Eisenhower and Kennedy administration than in current strategies.

⁷⁶ The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, June 2008, 6.

⁷⁷ The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, June 2008, 11.

The NDS emphasizes that *deterrence* “must remain grounded in demonstrated military capabilities that can respond to a broad array of challenges to international security.”⁷⁸ Such a statement has broad implications for the resources and capabilities to fulfill such a strategy that trace back through each administration since 1947 as each president sought to add more *demonstrated military capabilities* to enhance the U.S. deterrence posture. The U.S. and Soviet Union were viewed as peer-superpowers with comparable military strengths, until the collapse of the Soviet Union. Given the successes of the U.S. combat operations in the first Gulf War and Operations Enduring and Iraqi Freedom, U.S. conventional forces provide a credible strategic deterrent - based on *demonstrated military capabilities* - unlike any time in history and without a peer. Yet, U.S. policy of maintaining a nuclear first strike option in its strategic deterrence strategies contradicts its desires to lead a nuclear weapons free world while deterring conflict.⁷⁹

Indeed, the NDS makes the argument to “continue to field conventional capabilities to augment or even replace nuclear weapons in order to provide our leaders a greater range of credible responses.”⁸⁰ The NDS supports the New Triad of the 2001 NPR by emphasizing the benefits of missile defenses and precision guided munitions from deterring against an attack, to the protection defense affords should an attack occur, to the ability to strike preemptively if necessary. The position of the NDS on the role of nuclear deterrence that sums up the above is shown where it states that “the United States will maintain its nuclear arsenal as a primary deterrent to nuclear attack, and the New

⁷⁸ The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, June 2008, 12.

⁷⁹ The Obama administration has stated its desires to move to a world free of nuclear weapons, but recognizes the need to maintain U.S. nuclear stockpiles as long as nuclear weapons exist. Barack H. Obama. *Foreign Policy*. 2009. http://www.whitehouse.gov/agenda/foreign_policy/ (accessed March 4, 2009).

⁸⁰ The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, June 2008, 12.

Triad remains a cornerstone of strategic deterrence.”⁸¹ The utility of nuclear weapons as a deterrent is affirmed as it has been since the Truman administration, yet the purpose of deterring a nuclear attack and associated strategy is not exactly clear if the primary threat stems from non-state actors intent on acquiring WMD. A nuclear deterrent serves only as a deterrent against another state as it has since 1947. The NDS recognizes the challenges in today’s strategic environment where deterrence has shifted from deterring an attack from the Soviet Union alone to one that includes multiple states or non-state actors that could use a wide-range of weapons from nuclear, conventional, an unconventional to electronic and cyber warfare.⁸² The NDS indicates that strategic deterrence is not based solely on nuclear capabilities. However, the NDS provides no information on what form this non-nuclear deterrence takes, how it is structured, or how it is used to assure, dissuade, and deter.

The absence of a clear, broad strategic deterrence strategy to deter conflict is a primary concern today for American policymakers and strategists. For the past 50 years, *assuring* allies and *deterring* potential adversaries, was based on the American nuclear arsenal. Despite the addition of a *flexible response* policy to the strategic deterrence policy, the United States and the world have experienced episodic periods of conflicts, from the Korean War under Truman, to the Vietnam War under Kennedy, to the disposition of a regime in Operation Iraqi Freedom – all which occurred under the umbrella of a strategic nuclear deterrence umbrella. Ultimately, the policy of flexible response has resulted in a list of options to “do something” when deterrence fails, since the strategic deterrence failed in its basic purpose - to deter conflict. In the post-Cold

⁸¹ The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, June 2008, 12.

⁸² Ibid, 11.

War world, U.S security guarantees based on nuclear deterrence alone are not sufficient. The limited conventional military capabilities of allies and partner nations leave them potentially vulnerable to aggression in a multi-polar world. Global threats from state and non-state actors are a part of today's strategic environment that must be faced while simultaneously addressing the current global trends.⁸³

When military expenditures are examined since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. continues to lead all nations in military spending as shown in the figures 2 and 3.




Figure 2. Military Expenditure Increase, 1998-2007⁸⁴

Despite the massive increase in spending by both China and Russia, the U.S. still maintains a significant lead in military spending, which indicates that the U.S. has seen

⁸³ Global threats and global trends are briefly examined in Chapter II.

⁸⁴ Shah, Anup. *World Military Spending*. March 1, 2009. Available online at: <http://www.globalissues.org/article/75/world-military-spending#WorldMilitarySpending> (accessed March 1, 2009).

no relief in its security guarantees and commitments despite being the sole superpower. As it appears, with Russia's and China's military modernization efforts, the U.S. sole superpower status may eventually give way to a few great powers that will require a conventional state-state deterrence strategy.



U.S. Defense Spending vs. The World in 2007*

(in billions of constant FY09 U.S. dollars, with % of global total)

*2007 is the most recent year for which accurate data is available




Figure 3. U.S. Defense Spending vs. the World in 2007.⁸⁵

When examining the military expenditures above, combined with the global trends and strategic environment, it is apparent that a security gap exists between U.S. military conventional capabilities and those of allies and partner states. Potentially, a level of risk exists with this security gap that will require a new approach to strategic deterrence in

⁸⁵ Sharp, Travis. "Fiscal Year 2010 Pentagon Defense Spending Request: February "Topline"." *Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation*. February 26, 2009. Available online at: http://armscontrolcenter.org/assets/pdfs/feb2009_dod_topline_analysis.pdf (accessed February 28, 2009), 9.

order to deter conflict. Figure 4 depicts this security gap that has evolved as a result of U.S. security guarantees.




Figure 4. Depiction of Security Gap Represented by U.S. Military Capabilities Relative to U.S. Allies and Fragile States and U.S. Security Guarantees.

In essence, simply having a stated military capability, both “conventional and nuclear” is not enough if the goal of strategic deterrence is to deter conflict. Stated intentions must be accompanied by a consistency of actions in order to present the credibility necessary to serve as a deterrent. Strategic deterrence policies based on nuclear deterrence have not been effective at deterring conflicts in modern times, although they deterred a nuclear war. However, the security gap between U.S. military capabilities and U.S. allies and partners that must contend with global threats, while

addressing the effects and implications of globalization, requires a new 21st century strategic deterrence concept to fill the security gap to more effectively deter conflict.

“... war is an act of force, and there is no logical limit to the application of that force. Each side, therefore, compels its opponent to follow suit; a reciprocal action is started which must lead, in theory, to extremes.”

Carl von Clausewitz⁸⁶

IV. Two Levels of Strategic Deterrence

As Clausewitz infers, the reciprocal actions of deterrent actions must be considered for their desired effects against the possibility that they could lead to the undesired extreme of war. This chapter will focus on the concept of strategic deterrence and will examine two different levels that exist today – nuclear and conventional.

The central idea as defined in the Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept (DO JOC) version 2.0, Dec 2006 is to “decisively influence the adversary’s decision-making calculus in order to prevent hostile actions against the U.S. vital interests. This is the ‘end’ or objective.”⁸⁷ Since the objective is aimed at a *decision-making calculus*, deterrence is then based on logic and occurs in the potential adversary’s mind. If deterrence is based on the *logic* that occurs in a potential adversary’s mind, then it would *logically* follow that the nation with the most potent military capabilities – nuclear or conventional – would effectively be able to deter any adversary. However, Clausewitz warns of such flawed logic when he says:

...it would be an obvious fallacy to imagine a war between civilized peoples as resulting nearly from a rational act on the part of the governments and to conceive of war as gradually ridding itself of passion, so that in the end one would ever really need the use of physical impact of the fighting forces – comparative figures of their strength would be enough.⁸⁸

⁸⁶ Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Everyman’s Library Alfred A. Knopf New York London Toronto 1993), 85.

⁸⁷ Department of Defense, Deterrence Operations, Joint Operating Concepts, ver 2.0 December 2006, 5.

⁸⁸ Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Everyman’s Library Alfred A. Knopf New York London Toronto 1993), 84.

Clausewitz was speaking of the two motives that make people fight one another, hostile feelings and hostile intentions, both of which impact the logical decision making calculus of any group of people – civilized or not.⁸⁹ Saddam Hussein's miscalculation of the U.S. led coalition intention to invade Iraq despite the build-up of forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom demonstrates this point, though this was more a use of coercive force diplomacy as deterrence had already failed.

Given the number of wars and conflicts that have occurred under the security of the nuclear umbrella, deterrence involves more than logic alone. The actor who is to be deterred must be properly understood within the context of the international community as well as the strength of the national will of the actor seeking to employ deterrence. In crafting the deterrence message, several factors must be considered such as cultures and values of the groups involved, as well as their respective objectives. Risks and gains must be carefully measured, calculated and accepted. The credibility of the sender of the deterrence message must be believable.⁹⁰ Of all these factors, *credibility* is perhaps the one factor that is most important. To be credible, clarity of intent backed by consistency in application are essential. To intervene in the Bosnia-Serbia conflict to prevent further genocide where up to 7,500 men, and boys over 13 years old, were killed⁹¹ and to prevent further conflict escalation while choosing not to intervene to stop the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, where an estimated one half-million people were killed, sent the distinct message that the U.S. is selective in its application of any stated policy or strategy

⁸⁹ Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Everyman's Library Alfred A. Knopf New York London Toronto 1993), 84.

⁹⁰ M. Elaine Bunn, "Can Deterrence Be Tailored?" available online at <http://www.ndu.edu/inss> accessed November 2, 2008, 3.

⁹¹ Peace Pledge Union. *Bosnia 1995*. http://www.ppu.org.uk/genocide/g_bosnia1.html (accessed February 25, 2009).

involving the application of its military power, and thereby reduced the effectiveness of force as a deterrent.⁹² Though intervention is not deterrence, inconsistency in application of military power affects U.S. credibility and will influence the decision calculus of intended actors when considering the credibility of U.S. deterrence measures. Credibility is established through consistency of actions and applications of U.S. policies, in concert with a clear message, perhaps more so in other non-deterrence policies in today's strategic environment.

The DO JOC calls for a “grand strategy that considers adversary-specific deterrents on a global scale, incorporates cross-AOR effects, and factors in second and third order effects.”⁹³ Such a grand strategy incorporating deterrence would also require an investment in additional capabilities and resources, considering *global scale* requirements. Even a “national deterrence strategy that integrates and brings to bear all elements of national power” called for in the DO JOC⁹⁴ would require a shift in current U.S. approaches in aligning resources to strategies. The DO JOC calls on the employment of several concepts, such as deterrence and grand strategy, without a clear proposal for how to craft a grand strategy that employs all elements of national power to maintain a global-scale deterrence. The DO JOC, in essence, requires additional capabilities without providing a clear strategic concept for the application of deterrence.

⁹² A UN expert estimated that 800,000 Rwandans had died between April and July 1994, but not all of the causes of death were from the genocide. Human Rights Watch. *Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda*. March 1999. http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1999/rwanda/Geno1-3-04.htm#P95_39230 (accessed February 25, 2009)

⁹³ Department of Defense, Deterrence Operations, Joint Operating Concepts, Version 2.0 December 2006, p.7

⁹⁴ Ibid.

Strategic Nuclear

U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates recently warned that “as long as others possess nuclear weapons, the United States must maintain a safe and reliable nuclear arsenal.”⁹⁵ In the current strategic environment, there is “no broad consensus on the mission and importance of the U.S. nuclear deterrent,” but it is clear that the current U.S. administration’s “vision of a nuclear-free world” must be balanced with the “continuing need to have a credible U.S. nuclear deterrent as long as nuclear weapons exist...”⁹⁶ To address this 21st century version of a dual track nuclear arms control and refurbishment and updating of policy, the Joint Working Group Report offered two pillars:

The United States must reestablish its global leadership in nuclear non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament matters.

AND IN PARALLEL

The United States must ensure a credible nuclear deterrent for as long as is needed through steps that include continuing to refurbish and update its nuclear stockpile and infrastructure as necessary without creating any new nuclear weapon capabilities.⁹⁷

The U.S. nuclear deterrent must be capable of: deterring state-based nuclear attacks on the U.S. and its allies as part of extended security assurances; deterring a conventional war between the major powers; and contributing to the global superpower status of the U.S.⁹⁸ In conjunction with providing a credible nuclear deterrence, U.S. nuclear policies must continue to address counter-proliferation and nonproliferation and arms control

⁹⁵ Robert Gates. "Gates: Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence in the 21st Century." *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*. October 28, 2008, available online at <http://carnegieendowment.org/?fa=eventDetail&id=1202&prog=zgp&proj=zted> (accessed January 16, 2009).

⁹⁶ Joint Working Group of AAAS, the American Physical Society, and the Center for Strategic and International Studies. *Nuclear Weapons in 21st Century U.S. National Security*. Working Group Study, U.S.: AAAS Publication Services, 2008, 5.

⁹⁷ Ibid, 6.

⁹⁸ Ibid, 3.

measures as a way to address threats from non-state actors as well as stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons states.⁹⁹

Within the current strategic environment that reveals a landscape where major global powers of the international community have grown increasingly more interconnected for economic survivability and global security against nonstate actors, the likelihood of a nuclear confrontation is simply not realistic. While consensus on the need to maintain a nuclear deterrent will continue to be debated into the near future, the role of nuclear deterrence should be reserved for deterring a nuclear attack by rogue states or state actors with the emphasis on strategic deterrence held by U.S. strategic conventional force capabilities.

Strategic Conventional

The use of conventional forces as a strategic deterrent is not a new concept, yet it is one that has been employed with differing outcomes throughout history. In 1907, the U.S. fleet, consisting of four squadrons of warships totalling 16 battleships, under orders from President Theodore Roosevelt, began a 14-month circumnavigation of the world, that included 20 port calls on six continents. Called the Great White Fleet, it marked the largest-scale naval deployment ever attempted by any nation.¹⁰⁰ The success of the cruise had the intended strategic deterrent effect of signaling to the world the ability and

⁹⁹ Joint Working Group of AAAS, the American Physical Society, and the Center for Strategic and International Studies. *Nuclear Weapons in 21st Century U.S. National Security*. Working Group Study, U.S.: AAAS Publication Services, 2008, 4, 6.

¹⁰⁰ Mike McKinley. "The Cruise of the Great White Fleet." *All Hands* 841. April 1987.
http://www.history.navy.mil/library/online/gwf_cruise.htm (accessed February 14, 2009), 2.

resolve of the U.S. as well as American credibility to employ force.¹⁰¹ The power projection demonstrated by the Great White Fleet also demonstrated the U.S. ability to protect its interests abroad.¹⁰²

Another application of conventional forces in a strategic deterrent role was President Franklin D. Roosevelt's expansion of the neutrality zone in 1939. Roosevelt's aversion to war initially held him to a position of isolationism during the mid-1930s, acquiescing when Italy seized Ethiopia in October 1935, Japan invaded China in August 1937, and when Germany took over Austria and the Sudetenland in Czechoslovakia in 1938. Attempts to remain neutral by Roosevelt, who had to reconcile his personal aversions to war, the desire to help victims overseas, and comply with the series of Neutrality Acts passed by the U.S. Congress in the 1930s that restricted military sales to nations at wars, was replaced late in 1938 by the recognition that no nation could escape some measure of the consequences of the impending war in Europe.¹⁰³

After the U.S. had committed to aiding the Allies through lend-lease, a three-hundred-mile neutrality zone was declared around the Western hemisphere, excluding Canada, in which naval operations by belligerents were prohibited.¹⁰⁴ Roosevelt sought to secure a way to provide aid to allies while adhering to U.S. laws. The U.S. Navy patrolled the area with eighty destroyers and by 1941 was attacking German submarines.¹⁰⁵ Drawing from lessons of World War I, Roosevelt's actions resulted in relatively a successful strategic deterrent effect against Hitler, who in the face of

¹⁰¹ Mike McKinley. "The Cruise of the Great White Fleet." *All Hands* 841. April 1987.
http://www.history.navy.mil/library/online/gwf_cruise.htm (accessed February 14, 2009), 3-15.

¹⁰² Ibid, 16.

¹⁰³ Robert A. Divine. *Roosevelt and World War II*. Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1969, 6-23.

¹⁰⁴ Manfred Jones. "The United States and Germany: a diplomatic history." 242-254. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984, 242.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

“growing American shipments to Great Britain and the increasingly unneutral conduct of American vessels, which had begun to radio the positions of U-boats they encountered for the benefit of the British ... steadfastly refused to heed the ever louder pleas of his Admirals for permission to take effective counteraction.”¹⁰⁶ Hitler knew the U.S. could be dangerous and had given strict orders not to do or say anything against the U.S. that would allow Roosevelt to turn a European war into a world war.¹⁰⁷ The U.S. Navy successfully deterred Hitler at the strategic level employing conventional force.

More recently, the 82nd Airborne Division has been employed in several successful operations as part of the nucleus of the nation’s rapid deployment force (RDF). In March 1998, a brigade task force deployed into Honduras as part of Operation Golden Pheasant on a no-notice deployment exercise and show of force to demonstrate U.S. resolve in maintaining the sovereignty of Honduran territory when its borders were threatened by the Sandinistas. Though billed as a joint training exercise, the paratroopers deployed ready to fight effecting the withdrawal of Sandinistan forces.¹⁰⁸ The presence of U.S. conventional forces effectively deterred conflict with the Sandinistas.

In another example, the 2nd Brigade of the 82nd Airborne division was one of the first units to deploy as part of a task force in the defense of Saudi Arabia following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on Aug. 2, 1990, known as Operation Desert Shield.¹⁰⁹ The quick success of the Iraqi army in its invasion of Kuwait raised possible concerns that Iraq would continue its invasion into Saudi Arabia, gaining control of a majority of the

¹⁰⁶ Manfred Jones. *The United States and Germany: a Diplomatic History*. 242-254. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984, 253.

¹⁰⁷ Conrad Black. *Franklin Delano Roosevelt Champion of Freedom*. New York: Public Affairs, 2003, 544.

¹⁰⁸ Global Secuirty.org maintained by John Pike. *Operation Golden Pheasant*. April 27, 2005. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/golden_pheasant.htm (accessed February 24, 2009)

¹⁰⁹ Global Security.org maintained by John Pike. *Operation Desert Shield*. April 12, 2005. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/desert_shield.htm (accessed February 24, 2009).

world's oil supply. Operation Desert Shield was a show of U.S. commitment to the protection of a key regional partner, Saudi Arabia, as well as U.S. vital interests. On 7 August 1990, lead elements of the 82nd Airborne arrived in Saudi Arabia followed in the subsequent days and weeks by additional U.S. ground forces. Though initially light in numbers compared to the Iraqi strength in Kuwait, the 82nd Airborne reinforced Saudi forces on a defensive line along the Saudi-Kuwait border employing various deception tactics to give the Iraqis the impression that there was a much larger fixing force that must be accounted for in any attack across the border.¹¹⁰

Though the deployment of the 82nd Airborne served as a strategic deterrent to Iraq by rapidly deploying U.S. ground forces into Saudi Arabia, halting any contemplation of further advances through the region, the deployment itself meant that initial U.S. strategic deterrence policies had failed, given that Saddam Hussein had already invaded Kuwait. The deployment was intended to halt further Iraqi aggression and facilitate the build up of U.S. ground combat power. However, the deployment provides a recent example of the employment of a conventional tailored deterrence when initial diplomatic efforts fail to contain a regional conflict. The subsequent deployment of a U.S. led 30-nation coalition force prevented any potential advancements by Iraq and allowed coalition forces to mass in the region in order to compel Iraq to withdraw by the threat of military action while preparing to exercise force in the event a peaceful solution was not reached.

¹¹⁰ James F Duunigan and Austin Bay. *From Desert Shield to Desert Storm: High-Tech Weapons, Military Strategy, and Coalition Warfare in the Persian Gulf*. New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1992, 247-250.

In September of 1994, the 82nd Airborne division was again alerted again as part of Operation Restore Democracy, a U.S. led multinational effort under a United Nations resolution to restore the democratically elected leader of Haiti.¹¹¹ President Jean-Bertrand Aristide became the first democratically elected leader of Haiti in December 1990 only to be overthrown in a coup several months later in 1991, led by Lieutenant General Raul Cedras, head of the armed forces of Haiti. Diplomatic efforts to restore the democratically elected leader began with a United Nations international embargo in June of 1993 and eventually the establishment of two U.S. Joint Task Forces, one to provide humanitarian assistance and the other to conduct migrant interdiction operations, both of which were intended to put increasing pressure on the illegitimate government of Haiti.

In July of 1994, the United Nations passed a security resolution that authorized the use of military force to remove the illegitimate leader of Haiti. President Clinton dispatched a diplomatic team, that included former President Jimmy Carter and former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, U.S Army (retired), to Haiti to avert a force-on-force conflict. On September 18, 1994, with elements of the 82nd Airborne enroute, the leader of the military coup, Lieutenant General Raul Cedras, relinquished control of the government and eventually left Haiti through the diplomatic mission led by former President Jimmy Carter.¹¹² This depicts a classic example of where the military arm of diplomacy *encouraged* negotiations to find a peaceful diplomatic solution and a force-on-force conflict was deterred.

¹¹¹ Global Security.org maintained by John Pike. *Operation Restore Democracy*. April 27, 2005. <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1996/op-restore-democracy Uphold.htm> (accessed February 24, 2009).

¹¹² Ibid.

The implications of the current security guarantees require the United States to maintain its nuclear arsenal for specific instances of deterrence. Considering the nuclear umbrella and security guarantees that the U.S. has extended to smaller states and allies under NATO, to Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, there was never a need for these nations to develop robust military capabilities, whether nuclear or conventional, since *security* has been provided by an effective American nuclear deterrence. The United States cannot walk away from these security guarantees. Yet, while nuclear deterrence serves to deter a nuclear attack against the United States and its allies by another state actor, it is ineffective against the non-state actors intent on acquiring WMD.

When the current strategic environment is considered for the effects of globalization and the growing interdependency of state actors for economic and energy security, the role of nuclear deterrence is over-shadowed by the reality that a nuclear strike by one major power state against another may lead to an internal collapse and unintended disruptions of international economic systems even in the absence of a retaliatory strike. Thus, while nuclear deterrence serves as a guarantor against a nuclear war with another state actor, it has a limited role in deterring 21st century conflicts.

For these reasons, the U.S. must adopt a strategic deterrence strategy more suited for the 21st century environment. Conventional forces must take a more prominent role as the primary strategic deterrent. Strategic nuclear deterrence still has its place, but as seen in the 1990s, it was the commitment of credible conventional forces to the security of friendly states that deterred escalation in conflicts, such as Operation Golden Pheasant and Restore Democracy, rather than the stated threat of nuclear or conventional options. Recognizing the limited role of nuclear deterrence in the 21st century environment,

strategic deterrence strategies must deemphasize nuclear options as a first use, while emphasizing credible conventional force options, combined with the national will to commit those forces, in order to deter conflict. Although a limited number of examples of where conventional forces have been used as an effective deterrent were briefly examined in this chapter, deterrence at the strategic level failed as forces were operationally deployed to respond to a conflict. Said another way, the absence of a strategic deterrence strategy, that incorporated conventional forces as the primary deterrent, failed to deter the conflicts from occurring in the first place. A strategic deterrence strategy for the 21st century must incorporate the credibility and willingness to commit stated capabilities and then be consistently applied to more successfully strategically deter conflict.

“...war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means.”

Carl Von Clausewitz¹¹³

V. A 21st Century Triad: Diplomacy, Nuclear, Conventional

As states strive to search for, and sustain their future place in the world, regional alliances will continue to form and shift in response to global challenges. In this dynamic effort, the stability of governments within critical regions remains fragile. It is not unreasonable to expect that future state leaders will come into power seeking to threaten and even take by force resources within a neighboring country, especially if all they must contend with are the ground forces of that country.

The security guarantees of the United States continue to exist for the protection of its allies and partner states through the nuclear security umbrella. The Nuclear Posture Review and New Triad address this component of deterrence.¹¹⁴ As stated in the DO JOC, the 21st century strategic environment requires a strategy that addresses the complexities that will influence how states pursue goals, maintain security, and deter potential adversaries.¹¹⁵ A deterrence strategy must address the threats posed by the myriad of actors present, though realistically only state actors may effectively be deterred.

As long as nuclear weapons exist, states will incorporate them as a means to deter a potential adversary. States also employ regional, bilateral or international security alliances or agreements to bridge the gap between the deterrence value of nuclear

¹¹³ Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Everyman's Library New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993), 99.

¹¹⁴ Chapter III details the historical policies trends of the nuclear security umbrella and provides a detailed examination of the current deterrence policies that include the New Triad.

¹¹⁵ Chapter II provides an examination of these global trends and their impact on deterrence.

weapons and the deterrence value of conventional forces. This historic security problem for the United States requires a strategy to fill this gap.

Filling the Gap – A 21st Century Triad: Diplomacy, Nuclear, Conventional

Since deterrence is first and foremost an effort to influence the decision of a particular actor (a state leader, a military commander, a non-state actor), diplomacy is the first leg of the 21st century triad. Clausewitz described diplomacy as the “political intercourse” that may take the form of war (another type of political action) to prevent armed conflict. In the 21st century environment this means working with other nations to resolve global issues that can lead to conflict, countering threats, and to ensure potential adversaries understand the consequences of their hostile actions. Clausewitz further states that:

War never breaks out wholly unexpectedly, nor can it be spread instantaneously. Each side can therefore gauge the other to a large extent by what he is and does, instead of judging him by what he, strictly speaking, ought to be or do. Man and his affairs, however, are always something short of perfect and will never quite achieve the absolute best. Such shortcomings affect both sides alike and therefore constitute a moderating force.¹¹⁶

Diplomatic efforts, therefore, represent the moderating force that overcome man’s shortcomings and miscalculations. By diplomacy, the calculus for war is revealed and understood, providing ample opportunities for deterrence. In the role of deterrence, diplomacy is essential to communicating U.S. interests, negotiating peaceful resolution when those interests are threatened, and communicating resolve and the will to use military force to protect those interests.

¹¹⁶ Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Everyman’s Library New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993), 87, 99.

Diplomacy is also central to negotiating, implementing and enforcing nuclear non-proliferation, counter-proliferation, arms control and disarmament matters, which in turn address the means available that a state has available to incorporate into its security strategies. Resolving conflicting nuclear non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament matters against the need to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent represents the complexity of international relations. At the heart of nuclear technology and the development and possession of nuclear weapons lies the very issue of sovereignty. If a state determines in the course of its national strategy that it is in the nation's interest to develop and possess nuclear weapons in what that state views as the best interests of its national security, then the international community must weigh concerns of collective security against individual state national sovereignty and provide for a way to meet its security concerns.

We never have, and never will, propose or suggest that the Soviet Union surrender what rightly belongs to it. We will never say that the peoples of the USSR are an enemy with whom we have no desire ever to deal or mingle in friendly and fruitful relationship.¹¹⁷

Of concern from the international community of nations that possess nuclear weapons is the safeguarding and security of nuclear materials and technology. Though technologies exist to detect nuclear testing and transfers of nuclear materials, the ability to effectively monitor and track all such activities 100% of the time does not exist at present nor does the international will of all nations to comply, or enforce compliance, such as Iran's and North Korea's continued disregard for the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty. The U.S.

¹¹⁷“Atoms for Peace” address by Dwight D. Eisenhower, President of the United States of America, to the 470th Plenary Meeting of the United Nations General Assembly, 1953, available on-line at: http://www.iaea.org/About/history_speech.html, accessed 6 February 2009.

decision to sign an agreement with India to transfer nuclear technology without requiring India to sign the NPT has created international criticism, increased concerns from China and Pakistan, and weakens the U.S. credibility and international leadership position. U.S. actions once again conflict with policy and words. Contrast the U.S.-India nuclear technology agreement to the Bush administration's steps to transfer nuclear technology to the United Arab Emirates (UAE), on the condition that UAE sign the NPT and agree to international safeguards. Though U.S. Congressional approval will have to wait for the Obama administration to review and take a position, the act itself – seen as U.S. actions – represents another example of the inconsistency in application of U.S. policy and diplomacy.¹¹⁸

While diplomacy is essential for coordinating and synchronizing international efforts to counter potentially destabilizing security conditions by states and non-state actors intent on developing and/or acquiring WMDs, the expertise to develop non-proliferation and counter-proliferation measures resides in the Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). “NNSA’s “core expertise in nuclear science is central to the national effort to deter, detect, defeat, or attribute an attempted or actual nuclear or radiological terrorist attack.”¹¹⁹ The U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) is the lead for integrating and synchronizing DOD efforts in combating WMD.¹²⁰ The U.S. Strategic Command Center for Combating WMD (SCC-

¹¹⁸David Gollust. "U.S. Nears Nuclear Accord With Gulf Emirates." *Global Security*. December 12, 2008. Available online at <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/usa/2008/usa-081212-voa01.htm> (accessed January 16, 2009).

¹¹⁹National Nuclear Security Administration. "NNSA Strategic Planning Guidance for FY 2010- FY 2014." *National Nuclear Security Administration*. April 2008. Available online at: http://nnsa.energy.gov/about/documents/NSPG-FY10-14_04-08-08.pdf (accessed October 20, 2008), 29.

¹²⁰Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction*, February 2006, Washington D.C., 19.

WMD) is the primary functional enabling capability for assisting STRATCOM in integrating and synchronizing combating WMD within both the DOD and the U.S. Government (USG).¹²¹ The Director of SCC-WMD outlined the national strategy to combat WMD as well as the eight Military Mission areas that support the national strategy to combat WMD¹²², all of which magnify the synchronization and integration challenges involved across international boundaries, let alone interagency requirements. What is more, non-proliferation and counter-proliferation activities, important strategic components, do not serve as a deterrent.

Consider Iran's nuclear development program. Iran's claims for its right to continue to develop its nuclear program to meet the energy needs of its people run counter to a state that is considered to have an energy surplus of oil and natural gas and brings into question its peaceful claims.¹²³ As a state sponsor of terrorism, the threat posed by a "nuclear weapons-capable Islamic Republic of Iran is strategically untenable."¹²⁴ Diplomatic efforts, such as sanctions and treaties, and non-proliferation and counter-proliferation activities have been unsuccessful at deterring Iran from

¹²¹James Tegnalia. "Statement of Dr. James Tegnalia, Director, U.S. Strategic Command Center for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Director, Defense Threat Reduction Agency." *House Committee on Armed Services*. March 21, 2007. Available online at: http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/TUTC032107/Tegnalia_Testimony032107.pdf (accessed March 2, 2009), 7.

¹²² Ibid, 3. Dr. Tegnalia discusses several other organizations involved at the national level in the efforts against WMD, which speak to the multiple bureaucratic activities which must be synchronized.

¹²³Senator Daniel Coats and Senator Charles Robb. "Meeting the Challenge: U.S. Policy Toward Iranian Nuclear Development." *Bipartisan Policy Center*. September 2008. Available online at: <http://www.bipartisanpolicy.org/> (accessed October 16, 2008), 17. Iran is 4th largest exporter of crude oil, has the world's 3rd largest proven oil reserves and the world's 2nd largest natural gas reserves. The report makes the point that Iran could have met its country's energy security needs by invested a fraction of their nuclear program's cost in developing more facilities to utilize the country's natural gas alone. The country's investment in its nuclear program will make it dependent on uranium resources which clouds the motivation that its nuclear program is for peaceful energy alone when considered in context of its natural resources.

¹²⁴ Ibid, i.

pursuing its nuclear program. However, if Iran successfully developed a nuclear weapons program, the question of a nation's sovereign rights to provide for its security needs by whatever means it chooses must be addressed in the court of international opinion. If it is acceptable for France and the U.S., why is it not okay for Iran? As long as it does not threaten its neighbors the world may have to consider the possibility of co-existing with a nuclear armed Iran. In doing so, efforts to assure states within the region through international security guarantees by the U.S. will gain preeminence lest the demand for nuclear weapons fuels a rapid proliferation of nuclear arms to hedge against a nuclear armed Iran.

The 21st Century Triad: *Nuclear*

Though the role of U.S. nuclear deterrence in the 21st century environment is to deter nuclear attack by state actors against the United States, allies, and friendly states, it should not be a first strike option against states given the effects of globalization. Nuclear options in a world that has grown increasingly interconnected and interdependent under globalization are not realistic in minds of advanced states and thereby are reduced in effectiveness as a first strike policy. The existence of nuclear weapons in rogue states as well as in growing regional powers requires the maintenance of the U.S nuclear arsenal, where the goal of nuclear deterrence should be to deter state nuclear threats. A new provisional Global Strike Command was recently formed and is expected to be fully operational by September 2009, with the purpose of establishing a single organization operationally focused on the nuclear and global strike missions.¹²⁵ The Joint Functional

¹²⁵ Global Strike Command will take over command and control of the Air Force's intercontinental ballistic missiles and nuclear capable B-2 & B-52 bombers from JFCC-GS. John Andrew Prime. "Provisional Global Strike Command now has a commander." *Shreveporttimes*. December 19, 2008. Available online

Component Command for Global Strike (JFCC-GS) was established by directive in July 2006 to synchronize U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) global strike capabilities to deliver rapid, extended range, precision nuclear and conventional kinetic and non-kinetic, elements of space and information operations, effects in support of theater and national objectives.¹²⁶

The Global Strike mission and its operational embodiment, Contingency Plan (CONPLAN) 8022, emerged from the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review and its New Triad, as well as the 2002 National Security Strategy to give the President of the United States preemptive strike options to attack rogue states and their terrorists clients before they could harm the United States, its allies or friends.¹²⁷ The Global Strike mission and CONPLAN 8022 are different than previous missions and plans both in their intent and capabilities for despite being promoted as a way of increasing the President's options for deterring lesser adversaries, "Global Strike is first and foremost offensive and preemptive in nature and deeply rooted in the expectation that deterrence *will* fail sooner or later."¹²⁸ Thus, the U.S. maintains nuclear capabilities to deter threats, but the deterrence strategy has not adapted to the 21st century. While nuclear options will be considered and incorporated into such missions and plans such as the Global Strike mission and

at: <http://www.shreveporttimes.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20081219/NEWS01> (accessed January 16, 2009).

¹²⁶ Global Strike is an strategic concept that emerged from the Bush administration's vision of a "New Triad" where advanced conventional weapons were envisioned to permit a *reduction* of the number and role of nuclear weapons. Hans M. Kristensen. "Global Strike, A Chronology of the Pentagon's New Offensive Strike Plan." *Federation of American Scientists*. March 15, 2006. Available online at <http://www.fas.org/ssp/docs/GlobalStrikeReport.pdf> (accessed January 16, 2009), 6.

¹²⁷ Hans M. Kristensen. "Global Strike, A Chronology of the Pentagon's New Offensive Strike Plan." *Federation of American Scientists*. March 15, 2006. <http://www.fas.org/ssp/docs/GlobalStrikeReport.pdf> (accessed January 16, 2009), 3. CONPLAN 8022 was then a new strike plan developed by STRATCOM in coordination with the Air Force and Navy to provide a prompt global strike options to the President with nuclear, conventional, space, and information warfare capabilities.

¹²⁸ Ibid, 3.

CONPLAN 8022, the role of nuclear deterrence to deter state actors should deemphasize a first strike policy. The capabilities associated with the Global Strike serve as effective deterrent against a nuclear attack by another state, but a policy of first strike is not effective in the 21st Century environment to deter regional conflicts or conventional state threats.

The 21st Century Triad: *Strategic Conventional Expeditionary Force*

The 21st century strategic environment requires a credible, flexible military capability to deter potential conflicts. These capabilities potentially exist in the U.S. Air Force Air Expeditionary Force (AEF), the 82nd Airborne Division, U.S. Marine Corps Expeditionary Units (MEU), Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Companies (ANGLICO), Joint Terminal Air Control parties (JTACP), Joint Intelligence Operations (JIO) deployable teams, U.S. Navy expeditionary strike groups (ESG), submarines, carrier strike groups (CSG), and Special Operation Forces (SOF) in packages up to and including a Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF). These represent the conventional capabilities that countries that have received our nuclear security guarantees have not invested in and why they remain vulnerable to external force today.

These forces have a common capability – rapid mobility and striking power. Combined together as a joint strike force, this strategic deterrent force (SDF) is capable of augmenting friendly conventional forces or deploying as an independent force to show resolve. It is a highly visible, credible, and sustainable force that is intended to influence the decisions of a potential aggressor. By providing a capability as a combat multiplier to friendly states that do not possess these capabilities, an aggressor must now contemplate initiating hostile action against the United States. Additionally, a tailored SDF could be

sent to those friendly states that possess capable ground forces, trained by Combatant Commanders (COCOM) during peacetime operations, providing the ability to command and control U.S. airpower with a minimal U.S. ground force footprint. COCOM training would have to include as a long range objective that of training friendly state militaries to build partner capacity for internal and regional security, and to be able to fight as a combined arms force when augmented with U.S. airpower.¹²⁹

The U.S. maintains a forward deployed presence at strategic points around the globe. Such a presence shows the U.S. commitment to the global security of national vital interests and security of allies. Though forward deployed forces play a role in U.S. strategic deterrence postures by providing capabilities that can rapidly deploy into a critical area, they are still responding to a building conflict versus deterring it to begin with. Without a demonstrated capability on the ground, an aggressor may be willing to assume additional risk, not sure of the U.S. response. The ability to deploy a tailored

¹²⁹ Tim Hoffman. "Guidance for the Employment of the Force (GEF) Unclassified Briefing." *Joint Electronic Library*. September 17-21, 2007. Available online at: http://www.js.pentagon.mil/doctrine/training/wjtsc07_2feg_brief.ppt (accessed Mar 4, 2009), 5. Since the U.S. has extended and provided security guarantees from nuclear to conventional as described in Chapter III, nations receiving U.S. security guarantees did not significantly invest in or develop their own conventional military capabilities during the Cold War and as a result, do not independently possess credibility deter conventional threats today. Combatant Commander's (COCOM) have been tasked, in accordance with the Guidance for the Employment of the Force (GEF), with developing respective theater campaign plans that include Security Cooperation Activities designed to build partner capacity and increase regional stability and security. The following eight Security Cooperation Focus Areas facilitate accomplishment of regional security objectives: Security Cooperation Focus Areas, Defense Exports and International Collaboration, Security Sector Reform, Assurance and Regional Confidence Building, Intelligence and Information Sharing, Inter- operability, Operational Capacity and Capability, Operational Access and Global Freedom of Action. The GEF formalizes engagement concepts that are not new as U.S. forces have been engaged in military-to-military (mil-mil) training, foreign internal defense (FID), engagements for decades in efforts to build up partner defense capabilities for the benefit of the collective security of the whole. Most engagements are centered on the ground forces only as that is simply what most countries can afford. Those countries that do possess an air force only represent a modest power at best. As with the nuclear security guarantees that precluded the need for countries to develop nuclear weapons of their own, the implied security guarantees resulted in many countries choosing not to invest large percentages of their own GDP into self-defense. Air power, like nuclear weapons, also was not a priority – there was no need as long as the U.S. was willing to carry the burden of paying for defense requirements.

SDF that can augment a host nation's ground forces will provide a credible combined air-ground power to deter aggression. B-52s forward deployed in Guam may fly over or near an intended country with the purpose of conducting deterrence, through a demonstration of force as well by F-18 combat aircraft sorties from a near-by carrier strike group (CSG). Yet, unless the intent is to strike preemptively, such a show-of-force may prompt a potential aggressor to accelerate contemplated military action as much as it may deter it; the aggressor may want to pursue a desired course of military action before significant U.S. ground forces can arrive. A tailored SDF, comprised of either an ANGLICO unit or a SOF package or a JTACP with appropriate language skills, deployed to the host nation in the region in conjunction with a diplomatic IO message - that the U.S. is deploying a SDF to a region in order to augment the partner nation's ground forces with air power from a nearby CSG in order to deter a potential armed conflict - would provide a credible capability that the aggressor nation must now consider. The ability to control and effectively direct forward deployed U.S. airpower would be on the ground with the SDF that was deployed from CONUS and arriving ahead of transiting forward deployed forces. More than a show-of-force, deploying a SDF with the appropriate diplomatic IO message, demonstrates the resolve and credibility required for an effective deterrent as the host nation now has a significant augmented combat power.

The operationalization of U.S. military reserve forces have further absorbed a national resource that once served as a strategic force and signal to the international community that the U.S. still had capacity to access in the event of further hostilities.¹³⁰

¹³⁰ The 2006 QDR stated the "Reserve Component must be operationalized, so that select Reservists and units are more accessible and more readily deployable than today". Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chairman. *2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report*. Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, 2006, 76.

The ability to alert and deploy a specified SDF would eliminate perceptions that the U.S. is unable to respond to a conflict and thereby provide the credibility needed to deter conflict.

Supporting the 21st Century Triad: Command and Control

U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) would have responsibility for training, planning, synchronization, and deployment of SDF forces. The SDF must be identified in the GEF with: OPCON to CDRUSSTRATCOM; USJFCOM for support; USTRANSCOM responsible for deployment packages to move forces; and COCOMs responsible for supporting plans to employ the SDF as part of their contingency plans. SDF units must be identified and assigned to the appropriate level of planning and readiness under the control of USSTRATCOM. In support, all regional COCOMs must focus mid-to-long term security cooperation activities within their area-of-operations towards the objective of developing regional security alliances that can operate in a combined arms fashion to respond to threat warnings with support from the SDF.

Said another way, the COCOM Theater Security Cooperation Plans must be designed with the objective of not only building professional militaries to provide for internal and regional security defense, but to be able to operate in combined arms operations with U.S. airpower. ANGLICO, SOF, and JTACP units could be designated on a rotational basis as the initial SDF on a high readiness status, required to deploy within 24 hours to coordinate appropriate air and naval gunfire provided from the carrier strike groups or expeditionary strike groups from the littorals, or air power from an AEF. ANGLICO would be able to coordinate target selection for cruise missiles launched from U.S. Navy submarines or a detachment of tomahawk or cruise missile capable navy ships

from a strike group, or traditional naval gunfire and carrier air power. The augmented friendly ground forces, SF Coalition Support Teams, language trained and capable of directing U.S. air strikes, trained by the COCOM during Phase 0, now have the combat multiplier effects of U.S. airpower.¹³¹

This concept breaks with conventional U.S. thought in that a MEU or the 82nd is not proposed as the initial SDF. The initial ground combat power would come from the COCOM trained host nation supported with the ANGLICO or JTACP units. Although the bulk of ground capability would come from the assisted host nation, it can be augmented with a MEU or 82nd Airborne, as the situation warrants. These would serve as a secondary level of the conventional SDF, the first being the credible, augmented combat power of the assisted nation with an attached ANGLICO, SOF, or JTACP unit with the purpose of controlling U.S. airpower. Sustainment of the first level SDF (ANGLICO, SOF, JTACP) would rely on the host country receiving the combat augmentation. Feasibility of host nation sustainment must be assessed during Phase 0 and plans developed where sustainment by the host nation is not possible. COCOMs may facilitate sustainment through air drops by U.S. air forces from ship or CONUS. Where host nation ground forces lack proficiency, second level SDF (82nd Airborne, MEU) must be deployed in conjunction with the first level to provide the credibility required to serve as an effective deterrent.

Once deployed, the SDF will fall under the operational control of the respective COCOM as part of their Phase I contingency plan. Command and control would fall

¹³¹ Eisenhower's goal of relying on U.S. air superiority and regional alliances to deter conflict would come into fruition. Eisenhower was one of the first President's that sought to rely on U.S. airpower as a deterrent. See Eisenhower in Chapter III.

under the COCOM established Joint Task Force (JTF). If strategic deterrence fails, then the SDF is employed as part of the JTF to execute the contingency plan. Planning activities of the COCOM will focus on the integration of follow-on forces if necessary to augment the deterrent force deployed as a combat multiplier of the supported regional force. The COCOM would then provide for the sustainment of the operational deterrent forces until the crisis is resolved. COCOMs in conjunction with diplomatic efforts must work to form regional alliances that are responsive and effective to global as well as regional threats.

The U.S. has historically been “prepared to work with other countries in the region to share a cooperative security framework that respects differing values and political beliefs, yet which enhances the independence, security, and prosperity of all.”¹³² Where old alliances are ineffective, new security alliances must be formed that are more responsive to the rapidly changing threat environment in order for the national strategic deterrence strategy to be as effective as possible. Old alliances must become more responsive lest they cease to be relevant in the 21st century. In this effort, the U.S. has assumed a global leadership role in international affairs that will remain true in the 21st century.

A 21st century triad, comprised of diplomatic, nuclear, and conventional arms supported by C² will be the essential framework for an effective strategic deterrence strategy. Diplomacy must carry the information message that the U.S. will continue to protect its allies and friendly states and national vital interests and that the U.S. will

¹³²Jimmy Carter. "State of the Union Address 1980." *Jimmy Carter Library & Museum*. January 23, 1980. Available online at: <http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/documents/speeches/su80jec.phtml> (accessed February 24, 2009), 4.

deploy its SDF in order to deter conflicts. Diplomacy must also lead national and international non-proliferation and counter-proliferation efforts, while the nuclear arm of the triad will remain the ultimate guarantor of security from nuclear attack from rogue states against the U.S. and its allies and friendly states. The conventional arm of the 21st century triad must take the lead in deterring future state-state conflicts with a clear diplomatic message. Consistent application is necessary to build the credibility necessary to deter conflict strategically. The strategic objective would be to resolve international disputes, using SDF-backed diplomacy, before they result in a force-on-force conflict. It would be naïve to suggest that any deterrence policy or strategy would be successful at deterring conflicts all of the time. Given the interconnectedness of the international community in today's environment, combined with the near instant flow of news from 24/7 media outlets, a credible conventional strategic deterrence force that can rapidly deploy and augment regional security alliances will be more effective at deterring regional conflicts than the threat of a nuclear option.

“... it seems to me clear, even at the outbreak of this great war, that the influence of America should be consistent in seeking for humanity a final peace which will eliminate, as far as it is possible to do so, the continued use of force between nations.”

Franklin D. Roosevelt, September 3, 1939¹³³

VI. The U.S 21st Century Strategic Deterrence Strategy

The changes in the global strategic environment to include the globalization of world economies as well as the rapid pace at which media, news, and information is spread throughout the world with the growing influence of the Internet, calls for a change in our strategic deterrence policy. A nuclear triad that focuses on nuclear weapons capabilities alone is irrelevant in the world where the most likely threat of a nuclear attack comes from non-state actors that can not intellectually be deterred. The globalized world that has seen a diminished U.S. influence and the rise of regional powers allows for the U.S. to withdraw from “hard power” international diplomacy. This does not mean that the U.S. should not take unilateral action if its vital national interests are at risk. However, while the U.S. grows its soft power and the international community works to resolve regional security issues, a change in the U.S. strategic deterrent policy would strengthen its international position. The New Triad should be changed to reflect a strategic triad consisting of a diplomatic arm, a nuclear arm, and a conventional arm that form a 21st century triad.

The strategic goals of the United States have remained relatively consistent since 1947, to protect national vital interests and U.S. allies and friendly states. Deterring conflict has been a central strategic objective towards those goals with a deterrence

¹³³Franklin D Roosevelt. "On the European War." *Fireside Chats*. September 3, 1939. <http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/090339.html> (accessed February 21, 2009).

strategy based on flexible response and maintaining assured military capabilities, both nuclear and conventional, to deter the use of force. The 21st century environment requires a 21st century triad, diplomacy, nuclear, conventional, to achieve the strategic goal of deterring conflict.

The nuclear arm will consist of current strategic nuclear forces without placing emphasis on the different delivery vehicles and the first use of nuclear weapons. Nuclear deterrence should be reserved for the purpose of deterring nuclear war as long as nuclear weapons exist. The conventional arm should consist of three different tiers: rapidly deployable forces such as the 82nd Airborne Division, ANGLICO, SOF packages, and designated JTACP; forward deployed forces such as the CSGs and ESGs and MEUs; and all remaining conventional U.S. forces. The first tier will serve as the immediate SDF, signaling U.S. resolve and commitment to deter conflict by rapidly deploying to an area of operations. If the deployment of the first tier is insufficient to facilitate a peaceful diplomatic resolution, second tier forces will then be sent to the region. The final tier consists of the remaining U.S. conventional forces should the first two deterrence tiers fail.

The proposed SDF is represents a policy shift in that it would clearly state and signal a specific capability and intent that the U.S. is prepared to deploy in order to help deter regional conflicts at the request of the international community or responsible affected states. The diplomatic arm would work in concert with the SDF to deter rising conflicts before the military application of force is required. Diplomacy is critical to communicating U.S. resolve as well as trying to negotiate the peace. Having a clear

signal to send in the form of the tiers of the SDF will facilitate more diplomatic success to avert a force-on-force conflict.

The GEF and JSCP should reflect the assignment of the tiers of U.S. conventional forces to the SDF role. Current Global Response Forces (GRF) will be reclassified into the SDF role. Strategic documents releasable for public use should replace the reference to *global* with *strategic* when it comes to engagement activities. Though the U.S. retains unmatched global reach, using such words as global and shaping bring imperialistic overtones that can have unintended reactions. A strategic deterrent force as opposed to a global response force says that the U.S. is one of many responsible state actors, not the only state actor. The addition of ANGLICO and JTACP as a strategic deterrent force will require services to reconcile shortfalls in order to properly source and maintain the appropriate level of readiness required.

Additionally, within the GEF command relationships and responsibilities should be designated with: OPCON to CDRUSSTRATCOM, responsible for planning and coordination for employment within DoD and Interagency coordination; USJFCOM for force provider support; USTRANSCOM responsible for deployment packages to move forces; and COCOMs responsible for supporting plans to employ SDF as part of their contingency plans. STRATCOM will be responsible for the initial alert and activation of the tier one SDFs. COCOM's training of regional security forces should have the goal of developing ground forces capable of operating with U.S. air power, when augmented with tier one SDF. Once deployed, OPCON of tier one SDF will transfer to the COCOM for the integration into the defense of security forces of the host country and/or regional security forces. Tier one SDF will serve as the initial strategic signal to the intended

actor that the U.S. is committed to deter conflict, but is capable of defeating opposing forces if necessary with tier two SDF (CSG, ESG, MEUs, AEF) if the initial deterrent message fails.

The National Security Strategy (NSS) of the U.S. should state a deterrence strategy that the U.S. will deploy designated SDFs in conjunction with the appropriate diplomatic efforts to deter the rising hostile actions of the aggressor state. Making it clear to the world that ground forces of U.S. allies and friendly states are trained and capable of fighting effectively in a combined arms fashion with the rapidly deployable U.S. SDF of air, naval, or ground capabilities, will influence the decision calculus of any potential foe that it must consider the implications of U.S. forces before contemplating any course of action involving conventional force.

Defining a SDF as part of strategic deterrence strategy for a public release will also require the national will for consistent application of that strategy. Selective application will lead to a lack of credibility and strategic deterrence will revert to operational responses to conflict rather than strategically deterring the conflict. Said another way, if tier one SDF are not deployed in a timely fashion with the respective diplomatic message, the national decision will be one of whether or not to intervene militarily into a conflict rather than how to deter it. The SDF then becomes an operational deterrent force in theater providing leverage for diplomatic efforts to succeed in finding a peaceful resolution. If the leveraged diplomacy is unable to diffuse the rising tension, the deployed deterrent force provides the combat multiplier needed by the augmented regional force should the crisis escalate into a force-on-force conflict.

With a published deterrence strategy in the NSS that articulates that the U.S. will deploy specific SDFs to augment the defenses of stated alliances, partners, or friendly states future leaders will have to reconsider pursuing hostile military action against those states less risk facing a stated and credible strategic deterrent threat of the U.S. SDF in the form of a U.S. conventional military power.

“As for our common defense, we reject as false the choice between our safety and our ideals. Our Founding Fathers ... , faced with perils that we can scarcely imagine, drafted a charter to assure the rule of law and the rights of man -- a charter expanded by the blood of generations. Those ideals still light the world, and we will not give them up for expedience sake.”

President Barack H. Obama, January 21, 2009¹³⁴

VII. Conclusions

The complexity of the globalizing trends compounded with differing national beliefs, cultures, values and national presents significant challenges for the global community. Historically, it has always been a nation’s responsibility to provide for the basic needs of its citizens – security from external threats, rule of law, protection of borders, economic viability of its economy by providing for jobs, infrastructure, health and securing the energy, food and water resources needed to ensure the very existence of the nation itself. With the globalizing trends and effects of demographics, interdependency of economies and demand for energy, food and water resources, few if any nation states will be able to meet all of these demands and manage the trends to lessen negative impacts alone. They will require global solutions that transcend cultural differences and national needs. Yet among these trends the security threat posed by non-state actors acquiring and using weapons of mass destruction remains at the forefront of the most significant concerns against Western states.¹³⁵

¹³⁴Barack H. Obama. *President Barack Obama's Inaugural Address*. January 21, 2009. Available online at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/President_Barack_Obamas_Inaugural_Address/ (accessed March 4, 2009).

¹³⁵ Various strategic documents such as the *Joint Operating Environment 2008* address the threat posed by terrorists or non-state actor groups acquiring nuclear weapons or WMDs. Here the threat is referred to as a key-concern in the Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 5, 2008, 11.

How global leaders of both developed and developing nations address this common threat is dependent on how well they can arrive at a common set of objectives and shared values that meet their national goals and global interests. Where nations can come together to address a common economic crisis, they can not agree on a common framework to address global security concerns. The application of force by a nation remains politically charged and nationally motivated, perhaps due to the cost in human lives and economic investment. Such nationalistic views result in sometimes extremely different political positions and subsequent national actions even when confronted with what is evidently the same threats.

Considering the diversity of civilizations and cultures throughout the nations and countries around the globe, the quest for a viable peace remains a responsibility of the more developed nations, or so called super or major powers. It remains a responsibility not only to the citizens of those powers but to the underdeveloped and developing nations as well. To do otherwise is to invite eventual harm in some form, whether from economic stress, pandemics, or direct attacks resulting from the global trends that bind nations and peoples together for better or for worse. Finding common agreement to develop a shared responsible approach remains the central challenge as the leaders of all countries seek to meet the sovereign needs of their countries while considering the global reactions and implications of their decisions. Energy solutions for one country, such as coal, may meet the near term requirements while influencing the global climate if not developed responsibly. As nuclear power remains the most prominent solution to meet growing energy demands, the threat of nuclear weapons proliferation must be mitigated.

Nuclear weapons will continue to be a symbol of power – for good or ill – and may be viewed as a prize to be obtained by smaller, weaker states in a yet undetermined future. Proponents of nuclear disarmament would argue that such thinking fabricates non-existent threats and perpetuates the need for nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Supporters would counter that it is the very nature of the human dimension that requires the need to maintain the capabilities needed to defeat not only the current threats but the threats yet to come, as conflict is inevitable. It is not a matter of *if*, but of *when* the next war will occur.

As long as nuclear weapons exist, nuclear deterrence will be a part of any U.S. deterrence strategy. The nation's nuclear capabilities exist for the primary purpose of deterring a nuclear attack on the U.S. and its allies, and the U.S. must maintain these capabilities despite international efforts for nuclear disarmament. Despite the current strategic landscape that arguably indicates that the likelihood of a nuclear war between states is low, the fact remains that these are trends only, and are not exact predictions of what the future threat holds. Though many of the existing nuclear weapons states recognize the inherent illogic of engaging in a nuclear exchange, the cultural maturity and logic may not be present in as yet undetermined future leaders of current and future states, both developing and developed. As long as nuclear deterrence is a part a deterrence strategy, *means* and *ways* must be developed to deter conflict appropriate to the environment at hand to achieve the *ends* of that strategy.

Given the low probability of a nuclear war in the 21st century strategic environment, a deterrence strategy that is founded on strong diplomacy, a responsive nuclear force, and a strong conventional force of credible expeditionary capabilities,

supported by C² will bridge the gap between the nuclear and conventional threats to deter conflicts between states and when necessary decisively defeat adversaries. This is the 21st century triad.

A strategic deterrence strategy must be supported by consistency in actions by the U.S. as a global leader bolstered by the credibility to both commit military force as an extension of diplomacy, as well as to de-commit when supported states no longer warrant support. Compared to the diplomatic, informational and economic arms of national power, the U.S. military arm has been and will be relatively consistent in its roles, bridging the transition of power with each presidential and congressional election cycle. A stated strategic deterrence policy published in the National Security Strategy of the United States that articulates predictable actions is required to effectively deter state-state conflict in the 21st century, much as the predictable calculus of mutually assured destruction saw the end of the Cold War. A 21st century deterrence strategy must be able to transcend transfers of national power from one administration the next. Conflicts of the future are unknown. Employing a Strategic Deterrence Force, with a clear stated policy, consistently applied will help deter future conflicts. The 21st century environment requires a Strategic Deterrence Force as part of a 21st century triad to better keep the peace.

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Appendix A: Treaties and Alliances

Since the introduction of nuclear weapons at the end of World War II, the U.S. and Soviet Union have pursued efforts to reduce and/or limit nuclear weapons. The Baruch Plan introduced at the United Nations in June 1946 added the initiative for immediate penalties on any state that violated its principles of the peaceful use of nuclear energy as well as maintaining the call for the establishment for an international authority to govern all nuclear activities and to ensure that future such programs would be orientated towards peaceful uses.¹³⁶ The Baruch Plan was opposed by the Soviet Union who “countered that the U.S. should first eliminate its nuclear weapons” before any talks of establishing a governing international body and also argued that “independence in the nuclear realm could not be limited.”¹³⁷ This claim for independence is inherent in a nation’s sovereignty that would be the basis for justification for future states to seek and develop nuclear technology for both military and civilian purposes.

Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace proposal, introduced in December 1953 to the United Nations, attempted to control nuclear arms expansion by calling for the U.S. and Soviet Union to make fissile material available from their weapons stockpiles to states that would agree to peaceful uses exclusively.¹³⁸ Though Eisenhower’s proposal received widespread international support, the original arms control intentions were not realized as both the U.S. and Soviet Union produced more fissile material to replenish their weapons stocks. Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace program served to expand the

¹³⁶ Sarah J. Diehl and James Clay Moltz, 2008, *Nuclear Weapons and Nonproliferation*, Santa Barbara, CA, ABC-CLIO, Inc., 7-8.

¹³⁷ Ibid, 8.

¹³⁸ “Atoms for Peace” address by Dwight D. Eisenhower, President of the United States of America, to the 470th Plenary Meeting of the United Nations General Assembly, 1953, available on-line at: http://www.iaea.org/About/history_speech.html, accessed 6 February 2009.

dependency or ties of those countries that wanted the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology without the burden of the cost associated with developing a nuclear program independently. As Peter R. Lavoy concluded in his article on *The Enduring Effects of Atoms for Peace* “Eisenhower was no more or less successful than his successors in trying to balance the possession and possible use of nuclear forces for America’s defense with efforts to discourage other countries from acquiring nuclear weapons.”¹³⁹ The Atoms for Peace program hastened the proliferation of civilian use nuclear technology, and despite the condition of peaceful use only, Israel, India, and Pakistan diverted U.S. nuclear assistance to military purposes, while similar efforts by Argentina, Brazil, Taiwan, and South Korea were detected and prevented.¹⁴⁰ While the intent to provide peaceful atomic energy uses to other nations without spreading the number of nuclear weapon states had mixed success, the Atoms for Peace program resulted in the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna in 1957 as well as other important aspects of nonproliferation efforts that are still applied today, such as the concept of nuclear safeguards and the important “norm of nuclear nonproliferation”.¹⁴¹

The Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963 sought to stabilize the arms race and reduce environmental damage by banning atmospheric, sea-based, and space-based nuclear weapons tests, thereby limiting future testing to underground conditions, and was signed

¹³⁹ Peter R. Lavoy, 2003, *The Enduring Effects of Atoms for Peace*, available online at : http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_12/Lavoy, accessed February 6, 2009.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

initially by the U.S., the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom.¹⁴² The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, also known as the Treaty of Tlatelolco, was put forth for signature in 1967 in response to the dangers recognized by Latin American states from the Cuban missile crisis should one of their states be used for nuclear weapons by one of the superpowers.¹⁴³ By signing the treaty, members agreed to not develop nor accept nuclear weapons and committed themselves to the peaceful use of atomic energy subjected to a regionally based system of inspections.¹⁴⁴ This regional solution was unique in its time for these countries recognized a common threat and a common need and developed and entered into a regional solution, not one imposed on them by an external superpower. Though not fully implemented until the 1990s, the treaty set an important *nuclear-weapon-free zone* precedent seen in the South Pacific (Treaty of Rarotonga, 1986), Africa (Pelindaba Treaty, signed in 1996, not yet entered into force), Southeast Asia (Treaty of Bangkok, 1997), and Central Asia (Semipalatinsk Treaty, signed in 2006, not yet entered into force).¹⁴⁵

Despite efforts by both the U.S. and Soviet Union to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, China would conduct a nuclear weapons test in 1964 and it is believed Israel deployed its first nuclear weapon around 1968.¹⁴⁶ Israel's public denials and deliberate policy of *nuclear opacity* would later be adopted by South Africa and by India and

¹⁴² George Bunn, 1992, *Arms Control by Committee: Managing Negotiations with the Russians*. Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 32-48.

¹⁴³ Sarah J. Diehl and James Clay Moltz, 2008, *Nuclear Weapons and Nonproliferation*, Santa Barbara, CA, ABC-CLIO, Inc., 13

¹⁴⁴ Ibid, 13-14.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid, 14.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid, 14-15.

Pakistan¹⁴⁷ until their tests were conducted in 1998. In 1968, the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty (NPT)¹⁴⁸ would be signed where nuclear weapons states agreed not to transfer nuclear weapons technology to non-nuclear weapons states; peaceful nuclear technology would be transferred under international safeguards; non-nuclear weapons states exchanged their right to possess nuclear weapons for security guarantees against nuclear attack and for access to peaceful nuclear technology under international safeguards.¹⁴⁹ Efforts by the two superpowers to limit the nuclear arms race would continue with the 1972 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) that placed a ceiling for the first time on the total number of U.S. and Soviet launchers, while its companion, the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, sought to prevent another costly arms race by placing a ban on nationwide missile defenses and permitted only limited site defenses.¹⁵⁰ Both sides violated the intent behind these treaties to limit the arms race by developing offensive weapons with multiple, independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs); they may have kept to the letter by not developing new launchers, but the potential of MIRVs to overwhelm a defensive system made the ABM system potentially ineffective. Under President Ronald Reagan, the nuclear arms race would accelerate once more with violations of the ABM treaty in the pronouncement to develop the controversial Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), also known as *Star Wars*.¹⁵¹ Though SDI would prove to be too costly to field for the U.S., it is believed that the pronouncement of the initiative itself

¹⁴⁷ Ibid, 15.

¹⁴⁸ Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), available online at <http://www.armscontrol.org/documents/npt>, accessed 6 February 2009.

¹⁴⁹ Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), available online at <http://www.armscontrol.org/documents/npt>, accessed 6 February 2009.

¹⁵⁰ Sarah J. Diehl and James Clay Moltz, 2008, Nuclear Weapons and Nonproliferation, Santa Barbara, CA, ABC-CLIO, Inc., 16.

¹⁵¹ Ibid, 19.

served as a *cost imposing strategy* on the Soviet Union helping to accelerate its eventual internal collapse. The early 1990s would see the signing of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), by then Presidents George H. W. Bush and Mikail Gorbachev, in July of 1991 that represented the first initiative to reduce nuclear weapons rather than impose a ceiling, setting a limit at 6,000 warheads. Tactical nuclear weapons were removed from surface ships, submarines and aircraft by unilateral declarations by the U.S. and Russia in 1991-1992, and in January 1993, a START II agreement between Russia and the U.S. was signed taking the number of warheads down to 3,000-3,500 each.¹⁵²

Ultimately the effectiveness of any treaty relies on the leadership of the countries entering into the treaty and the willingness of the international community to enforce the agreed-to standards of safeguards, inspections and penalties for violations. North Korea highlights weaknesses in the NPT through its continued attempts to exploit loopholes in the treaty and episodic threats to leave the NPT altogether. The 2003 regime removal of Saddam Hussein from Iraq represents the extent to which the U.S., with its coalition partners no matter how loosely bound, was willing to preemptively prevent a potentially dangerous and destabilizing government to possess nuclear weapons or WMD. India's 1998 testing - followed by Pakistan - of its first nuclear device also highlights the ineffectiveness of a treaty if a nation chooses to pursue a nuclear weapons program benefiting from the nuclear technology provided to it for peaceful purposes. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) initiated in 1996 represents perhaps the most significant international effort to eliminate nuclear testing once and for all and required

¹⁵² Sarah J. Diehl and James Clay Moltz, 2008, Nuclear Weapons and Nonproliferation, Santa Barbara, CA, ABC-CLIO, Inc., 19.

ratification by all nuclear weapons-capable states to enter into force. Despite President Clinton's recommendation, the U.S. Senate voted not to ratify the treaty on the basis that it could not be adequately verified and that future U.S. testing might be required. Under President George W. Bush, the CTBT was still not ratified and remains an open topic to be addressed under President Barack Obama. During his presidency, George W. Bush announced plans to conduct unilateral arms reduction, withdraw from the ABM Treaty, and build missile defenses. Russia withdrew from the START II agreement following the U.S.' exit from the ABM Treaty. In May 2003, the U.S. announced a cooperative program called the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) where a voluntary group of states agreed to use various measures to prevent shipments of WMD and associated technologies. Other cooperative measures include the U.S. funded Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI), announced in May 2004, which seeks to remove highly enriched uranium from civilian fuel cycles that the U.S. and Soviet Union had provided to developing countries with research reactors. The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism announced by the U.S. and Russia in July 2006 set new national standards for protecting and detecting nuclear weapons and materials as well as to facilitate international cooperation in technical means of combating nuclear terrorism.

International efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons since WWII have been marked by fragile treaties with good intentions that were exploited by signatories and non-signatories alike, taking advantage of loopholes to promote their national interests. Loopholes resulted in subsequent treaties in an effort to close them, yet still yielded to the national will of the signatories either by the countries executives or legislative branches. Even positive cooperative measures such as the CTBT, the GTRI,

and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism are still subject to the voluntary and willing participation of governments and national leadership.

Appendix B: National Security Strategy Documents Related to Non-Proliferation

The March 2006 National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States of America states that the proliferation of nuclear weapons poses the greatest threat to our National Security.¹⁵³ The NSS defines the first objective under non-proliferation is to “close a loophole in the Non-Proliferation Treaty that permits regimes to produce fissile material that can be used to make nuclear weapons under the cover of a civilian nuclear power program”.¹⁵⁴ This is a diplomatic effort. The second objective is to “keep this material out of the hands of rogue states and terrorists”.¹⁵⁵ Such an objective falls primarily to international law and national law and intelligence efforts with military support as necessary.

The 2006 National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (NMS-CWMD) builds upon the pillars non-proliferation and counter-proliferation outlined in the NSS, as well as those of the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD)¹⁵⁶, and provides a comprehensive framework for the Department of Defense to work with civilian agencies to combat WMD. The NMS-CWMD details six guiding principles intended to serve as a foundation for the development of all combating WMD concepts of operations and plans: 1) active, layered, defense-in-depth; 2) situational awareness and integrated command and control;

¹⁵³ The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, March 2006, p. 19.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid. 20.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid, 21.

¹⁵⁶ National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction. "National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction." *Federation of American Scientists (FAS)*. December 2002. Available online at: <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-wmd.pdf> (accessed February 2, 2009). The CWMD defines three pillars: *Counterproliferation to Combat WMD Use*, *Strengthened Nonproliferation to Combat WMD Proliferation*, and *Consequence Management to Respond to WMD Use*. It also established a Counterproliferation Technology Coordination Committee to oversee the integrate interagency and national elements of power efforts.

3) global force management; 4) capabilities-based planning; 5) effects-based approach; and 6) assurance.¹⁵⁷ The NMS-CWMD further outlines nine strategic endstates which are essentially more detailed statements of the Defense Department's objectives of assure, deter, and dissuade.¹⁵⁸ The first endstate applies to the discussion of strategic deterrence stating that the "U.S. Armed Forces, in concert with other elements of U.S. national power, deter WMD use." However, the NMS-CWMD does not adequately provide a strategy to deter conflict let alone WMD as it provides more of a framework for integrating and synchronizing national elements of power to combat WMD. Instead, the NMS-CWMD assumption that "our [US] intent and actions *should* [emphasis added] deter a potential adversary from considering the initial or subsequent use of WMD"¹⁵⁹ presupposes that the potential adversary would logically follow US led efforts to combat WMD and would thereby be deterred from their use.

¹⁵⁷ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, February 2006, Washington D.C., 4.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid, 16-17.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid, 16-17.